A STUDY OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT*
OR over twenty-five years no systematic evaluation of the work
and organization of the Illinois Supreme Court has been published.
The last such study was made in i92o when the judiciary received
its share of attention at the time of the efforts to adopt a new constitution.' Although issues of constitutional reform are once again being hotly
debated, no such justification should be needed to examine the work of
the Illinois Supreme Court. Rather, it is surprising that in the intervening
years so little attention has been given to that court which is potentially
the court of last resort for most of the. litigation arising in Illinois.
Two major areas of research have furnished the data for this study.
Within the first-the written opinions of the Court for the year 1946-47an attempt has been made to discover the bases of the Court's decisions
and to investigate major developments in the substantive law. To this
end, all cases for which opinions were handed down during the terms
September 1946 through May 19472 have been studied. Those were selected for discussion which either made a significant addition to the law
of Illinois or which indicated the techniques of the Court in reaching decisions and writing opinions. An attempt has also been made to investigate
the workings of the Court as an institution, including not only those procedures prescribed in the Constitution and by statute, but also rules of
practice and the measures of convenience adopted by the justices.
Some of the questions guiding the inquiry are: What are the reasons
for the unusual distribution of cases decided by the court? Are the opinions affected by the quantity and organization of the Court's work? Does
the Court tend rigidly to follow precedent, or is there evidence of a shaping of the law for desired social ends? What are the techniques of statutory construction, and are they influenced by the Court's attitude toward
administrative agencies and local government bodies? Finally, what did
the 1946-47 decisions do to change, fill the gaps in, or reaffirm the law
in Illinois? At least tentative answers to most of these questions have
been formulated. Some remained partially unanswered and must await
additional investigation along suggested avenues of inquiry.
* This study was prepared by the Law Review staff and William H. Speck, Research Assodate, University of Chicago Law School.
I Illinois Legislative Reference Bureau, Constitutional Convention Bulletin No. io (19i2o).
2All opinions filed during the terms September 1946 through May 1947 and published
through June 18, r947 (397 IIl. 202) were studied.
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The results of the study are set forth in two parts. The first is an examination of the Court's leading opinions for 1946-47. The second is an attempt to describe and evaluate the Court as a social institution.
I. THE CASES
For a state which contains the second largest city in the nation and the
industrial and financial center of the midwest, the nature of the cases decided by the Supreme Court last year is startling. Yet the distribution of
cases among the various categories is not dissimilar from that of previous
years. 3 The explanation for the large percentage of criminal and real
property cases, the emphasis on public law, and the paucity of commercial
cases, is to be found in the Illinois Constitution and the Civil Practice Act.
To alleviate the chronic overcrowding of the Illinois Supreme Court
docket and thereby induce a more considered investigation of all cases
heard before the Court, Section 75 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act allocates the bulk of appellate jurisdiction to intermediate bodies-the Illinois appellate courts. Direct appeal to the Supreme Court is reserved for
certain specified instances. In the main, these instances are set forth in
the Constitution of 1870:

".

...

appeals and writs of error shall lie to the

Supreme Court in all criminal cases and cases in which a franchise or
freehold or the validity of a statute is involved ....... 4Legislation has
amplified these provisions, giving the right of direct appeal in all "criminal cases above the grade of misdemeanors,"s and in "cases in which a
franchise or freehold or the validity of a statute or a construction of the
constitution is involved," and in "cases in which the validity of a municipal ordinance is involved and in which the trial judge shall certify that in
his opinion the public interest so requires and in all cases relating to
revenue, or in which the state is interested as a party or otherwise ..... "
Despite the concededly substantial diversion of cases away from the
Supreme Court which has actually resulted, the peculiarly anachronistic
selection of cases for direct review has created a situation in which the
Supreme Court is occupied with many trivial cases, while many important issues are finally resolved in the appellate courts. Almost 75 per cent
of the cases coming to the Supreme Court arrive there by means of direct
appeal. The result is that during the last term more than half the cases
reaching the Court involved questions of criminal law or property, and
fewer than 2 per cent of the cases were business cases. Table i shows a
s Table !, infra, at 171.
4 Ill. Const. Art. VI, § ii.
5Ill. Rev. Stat. (i945) c. 38, § 7801.

61H. Rev. Stat. (i945) c. no, § i99.
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comparison of the distribution of cases among the various categories in
the Supreme Court and in the appellate courts.
It is apparent from the table that the cases occupying the greatest share
of the Court's attention are not those appropriate for the highest court
of an industrial and commercial state. Although this problem is a creature
of the Illinois Constitution, the Court has attempted to alleviate it by
narrowly construing the pertinent provisions of the Constitution. These
attempts are discussed in the first section. Subsequent sections deal with
criminal cases, public law, private law, and procedure and evidence.
TABLE 1
LEGAL RELATIONS GIVING RISE TO LITIGATION REACHING THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
APPELLATE COURTS IN 1946-47
APPELrATS COURTS

Criminal law .............
Property$ .................
Personal relations§ .........
Business lawl .............
Public law ...............
Procedure and evidence

(%)t

(%)

Full
Opinions

Abstract
Opinions

37.9
24.2

5.4
25.9
35-5
24.1
5.4
3.6

6.1
23.6
39.9
21.7

.o.o
r.6
23.8
2....
.4

2.5

6.r

* See Table 5,infra, at 171, for a more detailed six-year tabulation.
tSee Table 6, infra, at 172, for a more detailed tabulation.
t Includes real property, trusts, wills and probate, and landlord and tenant

cases.

§ Includes torts, workmen's compensation, and domestic relations cases.
Includes corporations, partnerships, contracts, insurance, negotiable instruments, and fraudulent conveyances.
Includes constitutional problems, local government bodies, unemployment
compensation, state officials, elections, eminent domain, and taxation.

A. APPEL ATE JURISDICTION

Even the less populous states have found it necessary to establish intermediate appellate courts to protect their highest courts frota overcrowded
dockets. Curiously, however, there has been the utmost diversity in the
criteria employed as a basis for the distribution of jurisdiction. One commentator has noted that "there is not a single question or field of the law,
and not a single case which would not fall within the jurisdiction of an inferior appellate court in some states and of the highest court in others."' 7
As already indicated, the phraseology of Section 75 of the Illinois Civil
Practice Act has its origin in Article VI, Section iI of the Constitution of
7Sunderland, Intermediate Appellate Courts, 6 Am. L. School Rev. 693, 694 (1930).
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1870. Assuming that the categories selected for Supreme Court review
accurately reflected the appellate review needs of a predominately agricultural community, it is doubtful that they satisfy contemporary requirements."
An eloquent indication of this failure to meet present needs is the fact
that more direct civil appeals to the Supreme Court have been predicated
on the ground that a freehold is involved than on any other. 9 Despite all
attempts to confine the scope of Supreme Court jurisdiction by strict construction of the phrase "cases in which a ....

freehold ....

is involved,"

and despite many previous rulings on identical issues, there has been repeated litigation of matters ostensibly well settled. Numerous decisions
have established the general rule that a freehold is involved only where the
necessary result of the judgment or decree is that one party gains and the
other party loses a freehold, or where the title to a freehold is so put in issue
by the pleadings that the determination of the case necessarily requires a
decision on the ownership of the disputed property. 0
In Homer v. Winnebago County" the plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for trespass to real property. The complaint alleged that
the defendant had built a highway on the plaintiff's land. The defendant
moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff's action was barred by a
prior decision that the plaintiff was not the owner of the land in question.
The motion was granted, and on appeal the Supreme Court held-that it
did not have jurisdiction because a freehold was not involved. An analogous situation was presented by Aubry v. Supreme Liberty Life Insurance
Co.," decided the same day. There, the plaintiff brought suit against the

defendant insurance company, alleging that she was the owner of a parcel
of real estate from 1932 to 1937. The relief sought was a judgment for
rent for the four-year period beginning in 1933. The defendant moved to
dismiss on the ground that the present cause of action was barred by a
prior foreclosure decree. Motion to dismiss was granted. On appeal it was
held that a freehold was not involved so as to give the Supreme Court
jurisdiction on direct appeal.
8

An examination of the debates and proceedings of the 1870 Constitutional Convention
fails to reveal specific reasons for the choice of these particular items. ll. Const. Conv., Debates and Proceedings (1870).
9 Table 4, infra, at 170.
"oNeill v. Kimball, 387 Ill. 58, 55 N.E. 2d 52 (1944); Cohen v. Ogliss, 384 fll. 353, 51 N.E.
2d 461 (1943); Joslyn v. Joslyn, 380 Ill. 181, 44 N.E. 2d 323 (1942); Gaskin v. Smith, 375 Ill.
59, 30 N.E. 2d 6 24 (1940); Harper v. Sallee, 372 Ill. 199, 23 N.E. 2d 27 (1939); Opdahl v.
Johnson, 3 72 11. 18o, 23 N.E. 2d 3 i (1939); Hooper v. Wabash Auto Corp., 365 Ill. 30, 5 N.E.
2d 462 (1936).
11.396 Ill. 382, 71 N.E. 2d 698 (i947).

2395 Ill. 584, 71 N.E. 2d 48 (1947).
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The determining factor in each of these cases is that the sole relief
sought is a money judgment, the assault on title being only collaterally
involved. While it is arguable that both of these cases might be embraced
by the principle that a freehold is involved where a decision in the case
entails as a prerequisite a decision as to the title of the property concerned,
and while it is conceivable that even astute lawyers might have been
misled by the ambiguity of the phrase, numerous precedents were available which should have dispelled any doubt as to the interpretation which
has found favor with the Court. Unless title has been directly put in issue
by the pleadings of the parties, pleas for money judgments consistently
have been found not to involve a freehold for the purpose of direct Su3
preme Court review.
In a related instance, the existence of a large body of precedent has
similarly not prevented repeated application for review. In McNabb v.
Sclinieder'4 the plaintiff, a judgment creditor, sought to redeem land of
the judgment debtor from a sale under execution and sought to have certain deeds set aside so that the plaintiff might be permitted to sell the
land in satisfaction of his prior judgment. The complaint was dismissed,
and on appeal direct review by the Supreme Court was refused, because,
if relief were granted, the plaintiff would be under no obligation to redeem
the land, and the defendants, as owners of the record title, could have
satisfied the decree by paying the plaintiff the amount of his judgment.
The holding in this case should have been no surprise to the litigants.
It long has been the rule in Illinois that in a suit to redeem from a judicial
sale, appeal cannot be taken directly to the Supreme Court on the ground
that the plaintiff also seeks to set aside instruments conveying the
premises to the defendants who purchased at the sale. s The Court has
pointed out that in these cases the relief sought is the right to redeem,
and where the decree in favor of the plaintiff could only establish the right
of redemption with the ultimate status of the freehold contingent upon
its actual exercise it has refused to grant direct appeal. Whatever questions of title have arisen in such cases have been held to be only incidental
to the right to redeem.
In Spies v. DeMayol'6 the plaintiff brought suit to recover damages for
13Homer v. Winnebago County, 396 Ill. 382, 71 N.E. 2d 698 (1947); Coburn v. Macke,
369 Ill. io6, r5 N.E. 2d 852 (r938); Kuhne v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 285 I1. 129, 12oN.E.
471 (x98); Pleasant Hill v. Stark, 277 I1. 302, 15 N.E. i88 (1917).
14 396 Ill. 92, 71 N.E. 2d 4 (0947)is Ziegler v. Perbix, 380 fll. 264, 43 N.E. 2d 971 (942); Joslyn v. Joslyn, 380 Ill. 18r, 44
N.E. 2d 323 (1942); Callner v. Greenburg, 372 Ill. 176, 23 N.E. 2d 29 (I939).
26396 Ill. 25, 72 N.E. 2d 316 (94).
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the reasonable value of oil produced from a tract of land. He contended
that a warranty deed, absolute in form, which the defendants asserted
was a mortgage, was an absolute conveyance of title. The trial court held
that the warranty deed conveyed the property according to its tenor, that
it was not a mortgage, and, further, that a small part of the land the
plaintiff intended to convey was unintentionally omitted from the conveyance, and that the deed should be reformed to include this land. The
Supreme Court held that a freehold was involved in the question as to
whether the deed should be reformed, but in a dictum stated that the principal question (whether the instrument from the defendant's grantor was
a mortgage or a deed) did not involve a freehold. This opinion clearly illustrates the rationale employed by the Court in accepting cases for review. Because reformation of the deed to include the omitted land would
necessarily require an actual transfer of ownership, the case was held to
involve a freehold. But the dictum disallows review of a suit to have an
absolute deed declared a mortgage because the operation of the decree
per se would not operate to divest the grantee of title. Assuming that
the trial court declared the deed to be a mortgage, the act of redemption
would still be required to transfer title.
Actually, however, it would appear that neither of these issues is of
more significance than those involved in many other types of litigation
which are not awarded direct review. The controversy over the reformation of the deed in the DeMayo case involved but a few rods of land and
was neither central to the case nor important to the community, yet
outmoded statutory and constitutional provisions required that it be reviewed by the highest court in the state. It is to minimize consideration of
such trifles that the Court has been compelled to distill the legal refinements exemplified in these cases. That the Supreme Court must dedicate
so large a portion of its energies to drawing fine distinctions in an effort to
avoid consideration of problems that may not intrinsically be of great
worth can hardly be regarded as salutary.
Despite the technical and severe distinctions which the Court has made,
there are areas in which its rigor has been relaxed. In Pennell v. Osborn' 7
an action was brought to void, on grounds of fraud, an oil and gas' lease
permitting the lessee to enter the land for a primary term and as long
thereafter as oil, gas, or other minerals were produced from the land. The
Supreme Court took jurisdiction on direct appeal, holding that a freehold
was involved. This ruling is consistent with previous decisions on this pre17396 Ill. 32, 7I N.E. 2d 56 (i947).
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cise point,' the theory being that as the term provided for in the lease
might last for an indefinite period a freehold is involved. It might seem
anomalous that the Court so easily concedes these cases to be within its
jurisdiction, but its solicitude can perhaps be attributed to the importance which leases of this character are felt to play in the exploitation of
the state's resources.
Analogous difficulties are presented by the cases purporting to involve
constitutional questions. The facility with which counsel allege that parties to litigation have been deprived of constitutional rights has induced
the Supreme Court to lay down stringent rules governing the review of
such cases. These rules provide that a bona fide and debatable constitutional question must actually have been put in issue in the trial court, 9
that the trial court must have passed upon it,20 and that such a determi2
nation must have been an integral part of the final decision in the case. '
People v. Brickey 2 contains a restatement of the Court's requirement
that to procure direct review there must be a sharper definition of issues
than is contained in the mere blanket assertion that a statute is violative
of constitutional rights. There must be a statement of the particular manner in which it is alleged to be unconstitutional. In this case appellant was
fined $I,ooo and sentenced to eighteen months and one day in the county
jail for a second violation of a criminal statute which provided, inter alia,
that a person convicted for a second time of keeping a gaming house shall
be fined not less than $5oo and imprisoned for not less than six months.
The appellant brought error on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional and that the punishment sought to be inflicted was so excessive as also to be unconstitutional. The unsupported allegation that
the statute was unconstitutional was found insufficient to confer jurisdiction. It was further held that where a sentence is imposed within the limits
of the statute, no constitutional question can be injected by merely assailing the statute as disproportionately severe. Strict enforcement of these
19Lambach v. Town of Mason, 386 Ill. 41, 53 N.E. 2d 6oi (i944); Greer v. Carter Oil Co.,
373 I1. i68, 25 N.E. 2d 805 (1940); Carter Oil Co. v. Liggett, 371 Ill. 482, 21 N.E. 2d 569
(1939); Watford Oil and Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N.E. 53 (i9o8); Bruner v. Hicks,
230 Ill. 536, 82 N.E. 888 (19o7).
"gVonesh v. City of Berwyn, 324 Ill. 483, 155 N.E. 276 (1927); Whittington v. National
Lead Co., 31 Ill. 263, 142 N.E. 474 (1924).
20Village of Niles Center v. Industrial'Comm'n, 371 fI. 622, 2i N.E. 2d 745 (1939); Holsman v. Campbell Realty Co., 371 Ill. 614, 21 N.E. 2d 744 (1939); People v. Fuller, 369 Ill.

17 N.E. 2d i8 (1938).
=Western & Southern Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 366 I. 240, 8 N.E. 2d 644

492,

(1937); Grutzius v. Armour & Co. of Delaware, Inc., 377 Ill. 447, 36 N.E. 2d 707 (X941).

=396 Ill. 140, 71 N.E. 2d 157 (i947).
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restrictions seems essential if any cases at all are to be denied direct appellate review by the Supreme Court. The bias of the losing participant almost invariably encourages him in the belief that the unfavorable decree
is "unconstitutional." As in the freehold cases, despite the efforts of the
Court to clarify its position and thus to effectuate the policy of limiting
direct appellate review, litigants persist in trying to avoid the consequences of these rules of exclusion. And these attempts in themselves negate the purposes for which the limitations on direct review were originally
formulated. The Court may spend almost as much time writing an opinion
determining whether a constitutional question is involved as it would were
it to decide the case on its merits.
In Tinkoff v. Northwestern University 3 the plaintiffs, father and son,
sought a writ of mandamus compelling the University to admit the son as
a student. The trial court dismissed the case. Within thirty days following
the order of dismissal, the plaintiffs sought to file an amended complaint,
which, if successful, would have injected a constitutional question into
the case. The motion to amend, however, was denied. The Supreme Court
held that the refusal to permit filing of the amended complaint after final
judgment was a procedural rather than a constitutional question, notwithstanding that the amended complaint attempted to introduce a constitutional question into the case. Presumably, the plaintiffs were bringing
their appeal on the hypothesis that, had the trial court properly entertained their motion to amend, a constitutional issue sufficient to command Supreme Court review would have been raised. But the settled
principle is that such questions must actually have been argued before the
trial court and that the court must expressly have resolved the issue in its
decision. Here the supposed constitutional matter not only was not passed
on, but was never even incorporated into the record. The only point at
issue was whether the trial court should have permitted amendment of
the complaint, a question remote from any constitutional consideration.
Another source of confusion is the failufe to distinguish between cases
attacking a judgment involving the construction of a constitutional pro.vision and cases attacking the judgment because it is claimed that its
enforcement will deprive one of the parties of his constitutional rights.
Only in the former is a constitutional question involved for purposes of
direct review. In Dube v. Allman' 4 an action was brought against the defendant for alleged violations by the defendant's lessees of city zoning
ordinances. On appeal before the circuit court from an order of the board
23

396 111. 233, 71 N.E.

2d

156 (1947).

24396

Ill. 470o,

72 N.E. 2d

i8o (1947).

A STUDY OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

of appeals directing the building commissioner to abate the violation,
evidence was introduced indicating that, prior to the occupancy of the
present lessees, the defendant's husband had operated a factory on the
same premises for more than forty years, and that the nonconforming use
being made of the premises by the present lessees was the same as, and
merely an extension of, the past use made by the former occupant. A section of the zoning ordinance permitted the continuance of such previously
existing nonconforming use after the ordinance became effective. Nonetheless the circuit court found for the plaintiffs, sustaining the order of
the board of appeals. On the appeal, based on an alleged violation of the
due process clause, the Supreme Court held that since a section of the
zoning ordinance conceded the right by which a nonconforming use may
be continued, the primary question resolved itself into one of fact as to
whether the same nonconforming use actually was involved, and that this
is not a constitutional question and therefore not properly before the
Supreme Court. That the Court continues to be plagued with large numbers of cases of this type is evidence of the resistance encountered in impressing parties that the Supreme Court is to exercise only highly selective
appellate jurisdiction.
Traditionally, to avoid multiple appeals and thus reduce litigation, a
general rule has developed permitting review only of final judgments, orders, and decrees. This rule has been codified in the Civil Practice Act. 2

But neither precedent nor codification has been of much avail in discouraging parties from bringing appeals. Frequently the attempted appeal
is so obviously counter to any definition of the notion of "final judgment"
that in disallowing it the Court finds it necessary only to quote precedent.
The defendant in People v. Hardt'6 was charged with malicious mischief.
The trial court sustained the defendant's motion to quash the indictment.
The appellate court reversed the trial court and remanded the cause with
directions to proceed in accordance with the views expressed in the opinion
of that court. The defendant sued out a writ of error to review the order
of the appellate court. Merely citing two other opinions on the exact point
involved, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ. Apart from the citation
of previous decisions the Court deemed the point worthy of no further
elucidation, apparently considering it obvious that remanding a cause
with directions for further proceedings could under no view be regarded
as terminating the litigation. The very order of the appellate court here
meant that there was to be further trial of the issues, and in this situation,
2S11.

Rev. Stat. (1945) C.XIO, § 201.

2' 395 Ill. 552, 70 N.E. 2d 577 (1946).
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where the original record was to be preserved, as distinguished from cases
remanded for new trial, any other interpretation by the Supreme Court
would have been inconsistent with the whole notion of final judgments.
Strangely enough, the Court in Matthews v. Trinity UniversalInsurance
Co. 27 itself overlooked this obvious argument. The plaintiff filed suit to
collect on the obligation of a $2,3oo bond. The trial court found for the
defendant, and on appeal the appellate court reversed and remanded the
case for further proceedings with directions to enter a judgment for the
plaintiff, without specifying the amount of the award, if no new defense
were raised. The Supreme Court rejected the appeal, holding that, under
Section 75(2) of the Civil Practice Act, the controversy was in the class,

of cases where a certificate is required to show the jurisdictional amount
involved.2S To accomplish this result the Court was compelled to make a
forced application of this section where none of its provisions was directly
applicable without an unusual construction. 2 9 The obvious, and simplest,
procedure for the Court, however, would have been, as in the Hardt case,
to recognize that the judgment lacked finality and to deny review under
the provisions of Section 77.
The recurrent theme implicit in the foregoing cases is the existing need
for procedural reforms capable of reducing the appellate load of the Supreme Court, while at the same time complying with the requirements of
the state constitution. Remedial steps should also be directed toward giving the Court the opportunity to broaden the exerciseof its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction, so that important principles of law might be defined
by the state Supreme Court, rather than, as is now frequently the case,
by inferior courts.
Unhappily, not only is current legislation not adequately designed to
effectuate these ends, but the Court itself has formulated a principle not
consonant with these objectives. This principle is that if a case involves
an issue of which only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction and also contains issues properly presentable before the appellate court, if it is taken
first to the appellate court, that court may properly assume jurisdiction,
21 397 I1. 174, 73 N.E. 2d 284 (1947).
28 Section 75 (2) of the Civil Practice Act limits Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in
such cases to those where judgment for the plaintiff has been entered in the amount of $r,5oo
or more, where judgment is for the defendant but the appellate court certifies that an amount
of $r,5oo is fairly involved in the claim of the plaintiff, or where leave to appeal is granted by
the appellate court regardless of the amount involved.
29 Explicitly under the terms of Section 75 (2) certification is required only when judgment
is for the defendant, whereas in the instant case the appellate court reversed a judgment for
the defendant and found for the plaintiff. It is difficult to see why the Court felt constrained to
make sole reference to Section 75 (2) when none of its provisions is directly applicable.
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and the right to have the Supreme Court consider the question of which
it would otherwise have had jurisdiction is waived. This principle has
3
been held applicable to franchises,30 freeholds, ' thevalidity of ordinances, 3
and constitutional questions. 3 3 Probably one reason for the creation of
this doctrine was the hope that the waiver provision would operate to cut
down the number of instances in which direct review might be claimed.
Actually it has served to motivate parties to make initial appeal to the
Supreme Court in all cases where there is even the slightest doubt as to
the existence of the right to such review. The operation of this rule puts
the risk of forfeiture only on appellants going directly to the appellate
court. It imposes no corresponding penalty for erroneous appeal to the
Supreme Court. The inevitable outcome is that litigants, even those with
but little hope of success, avail themselves of the opportunity to escape
both risk and penalty by proceeding directly to the Supreme Court. 3 4
A strong argument can be made for the total elimination of direct review by the Supreme Court as of right in any case. The provisions of Section 75 of the Civil Practice Act are neither required by the Constitution
nor beneficial in function. Article VI, Section ii of the Constitution requires only that the Supreme Court take ultimate appellate jurisdiction
of the prescribed categories. 35 Provisions for direct appeal are a purely
legislative product, and while much might be said in their behalf as mitigating the menace of double appeals, it is believed that the advantages
flowing from the suggested revision preponderate. Usually, where litigants are required to pass through a number of appellate stages, fewer
cases will get to the final appellate body. Since 1879, cases involving misdemeanors have first gone to the appellate court, the constitutional provision being operative only to secure final review by the Supreme Court,
and it has been found that such cases, in the main, do not reach the Su30 Cratty v. Peoria Law Library Ass'n,
31Bennett v.
32

Millard,

239

Ill.

332,

219

Ill.
5z6, 76 N.E.

707

(Igo6).

88 N.E. x65 (igo9).

Clark Teachers' Agency v. Chicago,

220 Ill.

App. 39 (i9og).

33Central Union Tel. Co. v. Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190 (1925); Cherry v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 372 Ill.534, 25 N.E. 2d ii (i939); People v. Terrill, 362 Ill. 6i, 299 N.E. 97

(1935).
34 An unauthorized appeal to this court delays the decision of the case until the record
can be sent to the appellate court and the proper term of that court is reached. It is the duty of
this court to determine whether it has jurisdiction, but the growing practice of bringing cases
directly to this court upon the pretense that a constitutional question is involved, when the
only matter in controversy is that the trial court has rendered an unjust or erroneous decision
is not approved." Ockenga v. Alken, 376 Ill. 533, 34 N.E. 2d 711 (I941).
-Resa, Necessity of a Change Concerning Appeals in Illinois,
165 (1936).

2

John Marshall L. Q. x61,
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preme Court.36 There is reason to believe that an equally desirable result
would ensue if other privileged causes of action were treated similarly.
The possibility of waste stemming from exposure to two successive appeals
becomes much less formidable when there is substantial doubt that the
second appeal will be taken.
Admittedly, the abolition of direct review by the Supreme Court will
further encumber the appellate courts. The effect of a crowded docket,
however, with the accompanying inclination toward haste and cursory
examination is less serious in an intermediate appellate body than in a
body whose time should be occupied with the most important judicial
problems arising in the jurisdiction. Perhaps the most efficient organization of the Court's activities can be achieved only by the elimination of
most appeals as of right through amendment of the Judiciary Article of
the Illinois Constitution.
B. CRIMINAL LAW

Over one-third of the opinions handed down by the Illinois Supreme
Court last year dealt with criminal cases. In addition, many petitions to
the Court for original writs of habeas corpus were dismissed without
opinion. A large majority of all decisions in criminal cases involved attempts by prisoners to secure hearings on alleged denials of constitutional
rights in their convictions. Thus the size as well as the basic importance
of the problem makes the need to furnish such hearings the most significant issue which the Court must face in the criminal law field.
Prior to 1943, prison officials did not allow petitions to be mailed from
state penitentiaries; prisoners who could not afford to employ counsel
were therefore unable to bring their cases before the courts for review.
However, in Ex parte Hull s 7 the United States Supreme Court held such a
practice unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection of the laws in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The subsequent change in Illinois prison rules, permitting prisoners to send petitions to the courts, 38
resulted in a flood of applications alleging unconstitutional convictions:
petitions for writs of error, for writs of habeas corpus in the trial courts
36 Dodd, Work of the Supreme Court of Illinois, 21 Ill. L. Rev.
4, infra, at 170.

207, 220

(1926); see Table

37312 U.S. 546 (I94i); cf. Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942).

United States ex rel. Bongiorno v. Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973, 975 (Il., 1944), aff'd 146
F. 2d 349 (C.C.A. 7 th, 1944), cert. den. Bongiorno v. Ragen, 325 U.S. 865 (I945); United
States ex rel. Foley v. Ragen, 52 F. Supp. 265, 267 (L., 1943), rev'd 143 F. 2d 774 (C.C.A.
38

7th, 1944).
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and in the circuit courts in the counties of imprisonment, for original writs
of habeas corpus in the Illinois Supreme Court, and a few motions in the
nature of writs of error coram nobis.
Applications to the circuit or criminal courts for habeas corpus have
been denied uniformly, almost always without calling for a response or
appointing counsel to represent the petitioners. The large initial group of
requests for leave to file petitions in the Illinois Supreme Court met a like
fate, 39 and such requests have diminished in importance since the decisions in People ex rel. Swolley v. Ragen4° and White v. Ragen.41 The opinions
in the coram nobis and writ of error cases also show that dismissal of the
petitions almost invariably does not involve a decision on the merits, but
is based on procedural grounds. This virtually complete inability of prisoners to obtain hearings on their claims of denial of due process of law in
their convictions calls for drastic revision of the machinery which Illinois
affords for post-conviction hearings.
Since 1932, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the due
process clause as requiring that certain minimum safeguards essential to
fair trials be accorded to criminal defendants in state courts. 42 Further,
the due process clause has been held to place a duty on the states to furnish some type of procedure by which prisoners' charges of violations of
constitutional rights may be investigated. 43 Most of the recent applications by Illinois convicts have relied upon these doctrines, alleging such
grounds for relief as lack of adequate representation by counsel, 44 use of
39 "In the last two terms of this Court, to April 21, 1945, 225 petitions for certiorari have
been filed to review the denial by the Illinois Supreme Court of leave to file petitions for
habeas corpus. From our examination of these applications, it appears that in no case did the
Supreme Court of Illinois depart from the practice of denying leave to file without calling for
a response and without opinion." White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 76o at 762 n. i (1945).
40

39o Ill. io6, 6i N.E. 2d 248 (1945), discussed at 121 infra.

4'324 U.S. 76o (i945), discussed at 121 infra.
42De Meerleer v. People of State of Michigan, 6 7 S. Ct. s96 (1947); Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
327 U.S. 274 (1946); see Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82 (1946); Boskey and Pickering,
Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure, 13 Univ. Ch. L. Rev. 266 (1946).
43 "A State must give one whom it deprives of his freedom the opportunity to open an
inquiry into the intrinsic fairness of a criminal process even though it appears proper on the
surface ..... Questions of fundamental justice protected by the Due Process Clause may be
raised, to use lawyer's language, dehors the record." Carterv. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 175 (1946);
cf. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (i935).
44De Meerleer v. People of State of Michigan, 67 S. Ct. 596 (i947); Hawk v. Olson, 326
U.S. 27, (1945); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 788 (1945); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 46
(ig45); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (x945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 47, (1945);
Smith v. O'Grady, 32 U.S. 329, 334 (i94i); see Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82 (1946);
White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764 (i945).
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coerced confessions, 4s and convictions on testimony which the prosecu4
tion knew to be false at the time of trial.
As soon as the Illinois penitentiary rules were altered to allow submission of petitions by inmates, the prisoners sought relief in the Illinois federal district courts. Almost all such petitions were dismissed, since
" ....

ordinarily an application for habeas corpus by one detained under

a state court judgment of conviction for crime will be entertained by a
federal court only after all state remedies available, including all appellate remedies in the state courts and in this Court by appeal or writ of
certiorari, have been exhausted. ' 47 Petitioners who had not exhausted
the available state remedies could secure a hearing in the federal'courts
only".... dn rare cases where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown to exist." ' 8 Most prisoners, unable to meet these requirements, turned to the state courts in their attempts to obtain relief, only
to find that their troubles had scarcely begun. Under present procedures,
it is nearly impossible to secure adjudication of the merits of alleged constitutional defects in judgments of conviction in Illinois courts; yet petitioners must present their applications for consideration seven to twelve
times in order to escape the procedural maze of the state courts and to secure their initial hearings on the truth of their allegations in the federal
courts.
Most of the prisoners, of course, have insufficient funds to employ counsel. Hence their petitions are filed pro se, and since prosecuted by the
prisoners themselves, they are modeled on other allegations and briefs
submitted by fellow prisoners. When the Illinois Supreme Court was thus
deluged with applications for leave to file petitions for original habeas
corpus writs, it adopted a procedure of denying such leave without requiring an answer, without appointing counsel to represent petitioners,
and without giving reasons for its action. Petitioners' next step was to
apply to the United States Supreme Court for writs of certiorari, a step
which the Attorney General of Illinois had contended was essential to
4SMalinskl v. New York, 324 U.S. 40 ('945); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 (1946),
U.S. 143 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); White v. Texas, 3o U.S. 530 (194o);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (194o); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). The
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use of coerced confessions to which no objection is made at the trial usually occurs, of course,
in cases where defendant has also been deprived of adequate representation by counsel.
46Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944); Pyle v. Kansas, 37 U.S. 2X3 (1942); Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); see Lutz v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764 (1945).
47 Ex parte

Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, :16 (x944).

48 Ibid., at 117; cf. United States ex rel. Bongiorno v. Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973 (111., 1944),
aff'd 146 F. 2d 349 (C.C.A. 7th, r944), cert. den. Bongiorno v. Ragen, 325 U.S. 865 (1945).
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exhaustion of state remedies.4 9 When the Court granted certiorari in
White v. Ragen, ° the Attorney General reversed his position, claiming that
the Illinois Court"s action had been based on the ground that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy in such cases, and that petitioners should
have sought writs of error coram nobiss, This allegation, if sustained,
would have placed the Illinois Court's denial of habeas corpus on a procedural and hence non-federal ground; the refusal to grant leave to petition for habeas corpus would not have violated due process of law, and
the Supreme Court would have had to dismiss the petitions for certiorari.
One week before oral argument in the White case, the Illinois Supreme
Court departed from its usual practice in habeas corpus cases by making
an "announcement" in connection with its denial of a prisoner's application.? The Court stated that habeas corpus was a proper remedy in Illinois only to consider assertions that the trial court lacked jurisdiction of
the person of the defendant or of the subject matter in a criminal case. In
the absence of such assertions, ". . . the question whether errors or irregularities have occurred in the exercise of the jurisdiction can only be
determined upon a writ of error." Furthermore, the Court announced,
. ... any petition which raises questions of fact, only, will not be considered. This court does not try questions of fact."5 In view of this statement, the United States Supreme Court was unable to rule in the White
case that the refusal of the Illinois Court to grant habeas corpus had not
been based on the same procedural grounds. The availability of adequate
non-federal grounds for the Illinois decision allowed dismissal of the writ
of certiorari without consideration of the relative scope of the habeas
corpus and coram nobis remedies. The nominal effect of the opinion, then,
was that petitioners need not apply to the United States Supreme Court
for certiorari to review denial of habeas corpus by the Illinois Supreme
Court in order to exhaust their state remedies. However, the full impact
of the Swolley and White cases, taken together, is far greater. Despite the
ambiguity of the "announcement" in the Swolley case, it seems that a
criminal appellant need not apply to the Illinois Court for leave to petition for habeas corpus at all, since such application can no longer be considered as seeking an "available" state remedy. As a result of the Swolley
49United States ex rel. Foley v. Ragen, 143 F. 2d 774 (C.C.A. 7th, x944), reply brief at x2;
United States ex rel. Sogan v. Ragen, 146 F. 2d 517 (C.C.A. 7th, 1945), reply brief at 2.
so324 U.S. 760 (1945).

51White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 76o (1945), respondent's brief at 8-4.
s2 People ex rel. Swolley v. Ragen, 390 Ill.
io6, 6i N.E. 2d 248 (1945).
S3Ibid., at 107, 248.
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case, this remedy has become a virtual dead letter. In the three opinions
in the 1946-47 terms which concerned such applications, habeas corpus

was denied because the trial court had not lacked jurisdiction of the per54
son and the subject matter.
The remaining possibilities for seeking relief by habeas corpus lie in the
circuit court of the county where the prisoner was convicted or where he
is now imprisoned. Such petitions assumed new importance when the
Illinois Court limited its own jurisdiction in the Swolley case. However,
applications in the circuit courts were no more successful in securing hearings than they had been in the Supreme Court, and the invariable denial
of petitioners' applications again led to petitions to the United States Supreme Court for writs of certiorari. Since the refusal of lower Illinois
courts to grant habeas corpus is not reviewable by the Illinois Supreme
Court, 5 the lower courts are the "highest court[s of a State in which a

decision in the suit could be had." 56 Hence, if the action by the circuit
courts involved a constitutional question, the United States Supreme
Court could properly have taken jurisdiction. Certiorari was granted in
7 to consider whether such a constitutional deprivaWoods v. NiersheimerS
tion of due process was involved in denying habeas corpus to petitioner s8
Once again the Attorney General argued that coram nobis was the appropriate and exclusive remedy, and that denial of habeas corpus had
therefore rested on non-federal grounds. The Supreme Court referred to
the narrow scope of the habeas corpus remedy in Illinois and pointed out
that under Illinois decisions the acts complained of by petitioner, although
concededly violations of due process, had not ousted the trial court of its
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Since a jurisdictional problem was
not involved, the circuit courts could have denied the applications on this
procedural ground, and the resulting lack of a federal question caused dismissal of the writs of certiorari.
The Woods decision removes the necessity for a petitioner, whose appliS4People ex rel. Hesley v. Ragen, 396 Ill. 554, 72 N.E. 2d 31i (1947); People ex rel. Forsythe v. Nierstheimer, 396 Ill. 193, 71 N.E. 2d 62 (1947), cert. den. Forsythb v. Nierstheimer,
67 S.Ct. 981 (1947); People ex rel. Thompson v. Nierstheimer, 395 Ill. 572, 71 N.E. 2d 343
(1947), cert. den. 67 S. Ct. 870 (I947).
ss People ex rel. Maglori v. Siman, 284 Il1. 28, iig N.E. 940 (i918); People ex rel. Magee v.
McAnally, 221 Ill. 66, 77 N.E. 544 (i9o6).
56 14 Stat. 385, 386 (1867), 28 U.S.C.A. § 344 (i928).
57328 U.S. 211 (1946).
s8Petitioner alleged that he had been beaten for four days until he consented to sign a
paper which he later learned was a confession, that he was not allowed to consult with counsel
before his trial, and that the public defender who was appointed as counsel entered a plea of
guilty over petitioner's objections. Ibid., at 212.
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cation for habeas corpus in the Illinois circuit courts has been denied without opinion, to seek certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. But
literal application of the Woods case and the Illinois law which it regards
as controlling leads much further. The Swolley "announcement"s9 successfully prevented the United States Supreme Court from compelling the
Illinois Court to grant hearings to all habeas corpus petitioners; although
its language is ambiguous, it, together with the Woods case, may have
the unanticipated effect of completely removing applications for habeas
corpus from the state remedies which must be exhausted. Allegations of
lack of counsel, coerced confessions, and state-suborned perjury, despite
the fact that they constitute denials of due process of law, do not oust an
Illinois court of its jurisdiction.0 Since habeas corpus is limited in Illinois
courts to jurisdictional problems, it is no longer an appropriate remedy for
a criminal appellant to pursue. According to this view, petitioners can
enter the federal district courts after seeking only two remedies in Illinois: writs of error and motions in the nature of writs of error coram nobis.
Since the primary purpose of submitting petitions is naturally to secure a
hearing on the facts of the allegations contained in those petitions, such a
result would be a long step forward in granting a speedier remedy.
If the Illinois Court takes advantage of the uncertain language of the
Swolley case to deny such a result, it can only do so by declaring that the
field in which habeas corpus is a proper remedy is not limited to jurisdictional questions. But enlarging the scope of habeas corpus would remove
the "adequate non-federal ground" which Illinois circuit courts now
possess for the denial of habeas corpus, and the Woods case would no
longer be law. The United States Supreme Court could then compel the
state circuit courts to grant post-conviction hearings to prisoners who
claim that their prosecutions violated the requirements of due process of
law.
The Illinois Court seems to be postponing the inevitable decision as to
whether it will or will not furnish any effective method for post-conviction hearings. The possibility of having to consider hundreds of petitions,
the major portion of which may be fabricated or unmeritorious, is not an
attractive one; but the Court could meet that possibility more effectively
by an attempt to establish a weeding-out process and to afford hearings,
than by closing off remedies gradually as they threaten to become available to petitioners.
59People ex rel. Swolley v. Ragen, 39o Ill. xo6, 6i N.E. 2d 248 (1945).
6oIbid.; People ex rel. Thompson v. Nierstheimer, 395 II1. 572, 71 N.E. 2d 343 (1947), cert.
den. 67 S. Ct. 870 (1947).
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With petitions for original writs of habeas corpus in the Illinois Supreme
Court no longer available where the petition raises questions of fact, most
criminal appellants have resorted to writs of error, which issue as of right
to prisoners. 6' In the last year, the Court indicated that a writ of error is
an appropriate remedy to correct errors which would constitute a denial
of due process. 62 Although the twenty-year commoni-law limitation period
which applies to writs of error6 has very little effect in barring prisoners
from relief, other statutory requirements exclude the writ of error as an
effective remedy. The criminal appellant is entitled automatically to the
common-law record of the trial and conviction, which includes only the
process and service, pleadings, orders, motions, affidavits, verdict, and
judgment. 4 If the prisoner wishes to present errors appearing only in a
full record, he must also furnish a bill of exceptions and the trial transcript
to the Court. But the transcript and bill must be obtained from the clerk
of the trial court at the petitioner's expense,6 5 and, more important, they

must be certified by the trial judge within fifty days after conviction.
Any prisoner who lacked counsel at his trial is highly unlikely to learn of
the fifty-day limitation in time. And many criminal defendants in Illinois
are without counsel at the time of trial because the court is not under a
duty to inform them of their right to counsel,6 7 unless they are involved in

a capital case.68 In order to be assigned counsel the defendant must state
on oath that he is unable to procure one. 69
6z Ill.

Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 38, § 769, 771.

62 People ex rel. Thompson v. Nierstheimer, 395 Ill. 572, 574, 71 N.E. 2d343, 344 ('947),
cert. den. 67 S. Ct. 870 (r947).
63 People v. Murphy, 296 Ill. 532, E29 N.E. 868 (1921); see Fins, Survey of Illinois Appellate Procedure, 36 Ill. L. Rev. 17r, i8o (194i).
64 111. Rev. Stat. (i945) c. io, § 259.36 (2).

65Ill.

Rev. Stat. (x945) C. 53, § 81.
66ll. Rev. Stat. (1945) C. 110, § 259.70 A.
6

7 People v. Van Horn, 396 111.496, 72 N.E. 2d 187 (1947); People v. Creviston, 396 Ill. 78,
71 N.E. 2d 25 (1947); People v. Loftus, 395 Ill. 479, 7o N.E. 2d 573 (1946); People v. McE1haney, 394 Ill. 38o,'68 N.E. 2d 715 (1946); People v. Foster, 394 Ill. 194, 68 N.E. 2d 252
(1946); People v. Fuhs, 390 fl1. 67, 6o N.E. 2d 205 (1945), cert. den. Fuhs v. Illinois, 325 U.S.
858 (1945); People v. Corbett, 387 111.41, 55 N.E. 2d 74 (1944); People v. Parcora, 358 Ill.
448, z93 N.E. 477 (1934).
68 Ill. Rev. Stat. (x945) c. 38, § 730.
6

9 Ibid. In People v. Bute, 396 Ill. 588, 72 M.t. 2d 813 (i947), the Court effectively foreclosed any attack on the constitutionality of the statute by ruling that the question could not
be raised in the Supreme Court if it had not first been raised in the trial court. Obviously, no
defendant who knew of the statute and thus could challenge its constitutionality in the trial
court would fail to request counsel in accordance with the statute. Thus the question cannot
be raised at all.
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Thus the majority of criminal cases during the last year came up with
a common-law record only, almost always prosecuted by the prisoner himself. When the court is confronted with the common-law record, its task is
simple; any defendant who alleges denial of due process receives a theoretical hearing on the merits which is actually a mere formality. Typical
of such cases is People v. McElcaney,70 in which petitioner alleged that he
was not allowed to consult a lawyer or see his family from his arrest until
the trial, that he was not given a preliminary hearing before a magistrate
or given an opportunity to be released on bail, and that the State's Attorney wrongfully entered a plea of guilty after petitioner had refused to so
plead. The absence of a bill of exceptions limited the Court to consideration of the common-law record; 7' and the common-law record naturally
contained nothing to support petitioner's contentions. Nearly all writs of
error result in affirmance of the convictions because of the double-barreled
rule that the lack of a bill of exceptions restricts the Court's investigation
to the common-law record, and that ....

the record itself imports abso-

lute verity and can neither be contradicted nor amended except by other
matter of record." 72In the absence of affirmative statements in the record
showing violation of due process, then, the trial court is presumed to have
performed its duty properly. During the last year, the Court disposed of
allegations that criminal defendants had not been furnished counsel,7 3
had been inadequately represented by counsel74 had not been given an
explanation of the consequences of a plea of guilty, 75 had been sentenced
in violation of an agreement made with the State's Attorney for a lighter
sentence in exchange for a plea of guilty, 76 had been convicted on the basis
of illegally obtained evidence, 77 had been coerced and compelled to enter
70394 Ill. 380, 68 N.E. 2d 715 (1946).
7 Ibid.; People v. Conn, 391 Ill. z9o, 62 N.E. 2d 8o6 (1945); People v. Street, 353 Ill. 6o,
z86 N.E. 534 (z933).
2People v. Haupris, 396 Il1. 208, 210, 7, N.E. 2d 68, 69 (1947), cert. den. Haupris v. Illinois, 67 S. Ct. io88 (1947); cf. People v. W~shington, 396 Ill. 30, 71 N.E. 2d 9 (1947); People ex
rel. Cohen v. Ragen, 392 Ill. 452, 64 N.E. 2d 876 (1946).
73People v. Van Horn, 396 Ill. 496, 72 N.E. 2d 187 (1947); People v. Creviston, 396 111.
78, 71 N.E. 2d 25 (1947); People v. Loftus, 395 Ill. 479, 7o N.E. 2d 573 (1946); People v.
McElhaney, 394 Ill. 38o, 68 N.E. 2d 715 (1946).
74People v. Staryak, 396 Ill. 573, 72 N.E. 2d 8r5 (1947); People v. Christison, 396 Ill. 549,
72 N.E. 2d 185 (1947); People v. Geddes, 396 Ill. 522, 72 N.E. 191 (1947); People ex rel.
Thompson v. Nierstheimer, 395 Ill. 572, 71 N.E. 2d 343 (1947); People v. Klein, 395 Ill. 449,
70 N.E. 2d 559 (1946); People v. Burnett, 395 Ill. X79, 6g N.E. 2d 856 (1946); People v. Witt,
394 Ill. 405, 68 N.E. 2d 731 (1946).
7s People v. McElhaney, 394 Ill. 380, 68 N.E. 2d 715 (1946).

People v. Burnett, 395 Ill. 179, 69 N.E. 2d 856 (1946).
77People v. Winston, 395 Ill. 263, 69 N.E. 2d 691 (1946).
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a plea of guilty, 7 and had been rushed into trial; 79 yet not once was an
actual hearing given to determine the truth of the allegations contained
in the petitions. The invariable practice was to declare that since the record
failed to sustain the appellants' claims affirmatively, no grounds existed
for reversal. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court last year
accepted and applied the Illinois rule which restricts review to those facts
disclosed by the common-law record, so that convictions were affirmed in
two casesso despite allegations that the petitioners were denied the assistance of counsel in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. These rulings
establish the validity of the Illinois procedure, so that there is very little
likelihood that the Illinois Court will alter its practice.
In the few cases in which writs of error resulted in the reversal of convictions, the Court's rulings rested primarily on technical rather than constitutional grounds. Thus petitioners obtained reversals where notice of
an amended sentence had been given to the prisoner's former counsel
rather than the prisoner himself,8' where the prisoner's sentence under the
Habitual Criminal Act was invalid because his previous sentence had been
served in the reformatory instead of the penitentiary, 82 where the sentence
imposed on petitioner was improper, 3 and where a prior conviction had
been for larceny of an automobile and not for grand larceny.8 4 Obviously
the writ of error is far from a satisfactory method to obtain hearings on
the merits where the allegation is the violation of a constitutional right.
The Court's adherence to the doctrine of limited review has practically
extinguished these writs as a means of securing effective post-conviction
hearings.
The remaining state remedy is the motion which has replaced the common-law writ of error coram nobis in Illinois.' - This motion brings "before
the court rendering the judgment matters of fact not appearing of record,
which, if known at the time the judgment was rendered, would have prevented its rendition." 8 6 Thus the coram nobis proceeding is the only one
78 People

v. Van Horn, 396 Ill. 496, 72 N.E. 2d 187 (i947).

v. Bute, 396 Ill. 588, 72 N.E. 2d 813 (1947); People v. Staryak, 396 Ill.
573, 72
N.E. 2d 8z5 (1947).
8oFoster v. Illinois, 67 S. Ct. 1716, x719 (i947); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
79 People

81People v. Wos, 395 Ill. 172, 69 N.E. 2d 858 (1946).
82People v. Perkins, 395 Ill. 553, 70 N.E. 2d 622 (1946).
83People v. Lueckfield, 396 Ill. 520, 72 N.E. 2d x98 (1947).
84 People v. Berger, 396 Ill. 97, 71 N.E. 2d 6 (1947).

85111. Rev. Stat. (i945) c. i1o, § 196.
86People v. Tuohy, 397 Ill.
19, 24, 72 N.E. 2d 827, 830 (i947).
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in which most prisoners alleging denial of due process of law can obtain
an actual hearing on the facts of their allegations. Unfortunately, many
prisoners cannot resort to coram nobis because of a five-year limitation
period running from the date of conviction; and the limitation has been
held constitutional in its application to criminal cases.8 7 Although the
statute does provide that the limitation will not apply where the party
seeking relief was "under duress, at the time of passing judgment,""8 the
Court has held that imprisonment after a conviction alleged to be erroneous does not constitute "duress" under the statute.8'9 Hence prisoners
whose conviction occurred at least five years ago need not seek coram
nobis in order to exhaust their state remedies. 9'
The full scope of the coram nobis motion is not yet known, since not
many prisoners have tried this remedy. But the Court has stated its function as " .... to bring to the attention of the court and to obtain relief
upon errors of fact, such as death of either party pending the suit, or infancy, where there was no guardian, or coverture, or a valid defense
existing in fact but which, without negligence upon the part of the defendant, was not made either through duress, fraud, or excusable mistake
of such a character that if known in time would have prevented the
rendition and entry of the judgment." 9" Coram nobis motions do not lie
for newly discovered evidence, for false testimony at the trial, or for the
correction of any matter which has been adjudicated. 92 In addition, since
the motion applies only to facts not known to the court at the time of
trial, it may not be used to contradict matters of record. 93
Two of the coram nobis cases considered in the last year added to the
gradual definition of the scope of the remedy. 94 Greene v. People9s held
that the coram nobis motion was the appropriate method to review allega8

7Ibid.; People v. Rave, 392 11. 435, 65 N.E. 2d 23 (1946).
88111. Rev. Stat. (1945) C. xio, § 196.
89 People v. Rave, 392 11. 435, 65 N.E. 2d 23 (1946).
90 United States ex rel. Rooney v. Ragen, 158 F. 2d 346 (C.C.A. 7th, 1946), cert. den.
67 S. Ct. 1532 (1947).
9' People v. Thon, 374 Il1. 624, 629, 3o N.E. 2d 54, 57 (1940).
92People v. Tuohy, 397 Ill. 19, 72 N.E. 2d 827 (1947); People v. Gleitsman, 396 Ill. 499,
N.E. 2d 208 (1947); People v. Drysch, 3X IMI. 342, 143 N.E. 100 (1924).
93People v. Rave, 392 Il.435, 6 5 N.E. 2d 23 (1946).
94 The only other coram nobis case decided last term added little to the already known
scope of the motion. In People v. Gleitsman, 396 Ill. 499, 72 N.E. 2d 208 (1947), the Court
again declared coram nobis motions unavailable to correct false testimony, or to consider new
evidence, or to review matters which have been once finally determined.
72

95397 Ill.
137, 7S N.E. 2d 325 (1947).
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tions that a plea of guilty was induced by duress and deceit on the part of
the State's prosecuting officials, and that the actions of the latter deprived
petitioner of a defense which would have prevented the rendition of the
judgment. In People v. Tuohy96 the Court reaffirmed the constitutionality
of the five-year statutory limitation as it applies to coram nobis proceedings which review criminal convictions, and reiterated the non-availability
of coram nobis as a remedy for newly discovered testimony or for alleged
perjured testimony. The most significant portion of the opinion, however,
dealt with the necessity of affidavits to support allegations in the prisoner's petition. The Court stated that, even upon demurrer, allegations of
false testimony by a witness in the trial court would be regarded as conclusions drawn by the pleader and based on hearsay matter, and would
therefore not be regarded as true. The Court's holding seems to establish
a requirement that the petitioner, in order to invoke the coram nobis
remedy, must not only bring his allegations within the limited scope of
that remedy, but must support his allegations by affidavits whenever the
pleader relies on facts which are not within his personal knowledge.
In its application to criminal defendants seeking review of their convictions, the motion in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis is far superior
to either habeas corpus or the ordinary writ of error. The motion should
lie to set aside convictions based on coerced confessions, whether or not the
petitioners also allege inadequate representation by counsel, and it should
also be available to consider allegations of perjury suborned by prosecuting attorneys, since the fraud on the court involved in the latter offense
distinguishes it from ordinary false testimony. However, coram nobis
motions cannot be used to investigate most charges of lack of counsel,
since such lack is obviously a fact known by the trial court; nor can the
remedy be employed to allege failure of the trial court to explain the significance of a plea of guilty, since such an allegation contradicts the usual
common law record of the trial. Furthermore, the five-year limitation
period prevents the use of the coram nobis proceeding by many prisoners. 97
In short, then, the superiority of the coram nobis motion is purely relative;
the inevitable conclusion must be reached that the state of Illinois provides no satisfactory or adequate method for post-conviction hearings, a
failure which violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
If the Illinois Supreme Court frankly admitted the virtually complete
inadequacy of state remedies, prisoners whose convictions violated their
96397 Ill. 19, 72 N.E. 2d 827 (1947).

97 More than one-third of the criminal opinions handed down by the Court during the
x946-47 term involved prisoners who had been convicted over five years ago.
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constitutional rights could seek speedy relief in the federal courts; but such
an admission would be embarrassing to the Court. If the Court made a
dear, unambiguous statement of what remedies are available and under
what circumstances they are appropriate, the present spectacle of petitioners continuously encountering blind alleys in their fruitless search for
relief would be halted; 95 but the Court's failure to make such a declaration, and the use of inconsistent arguments by the Attorney General to
avoid the opening of any adequate remedies, seem to disclose a desire to
leave the situation in its present vague state if possible. Perhaps most of
the petitions are untrue; probably the granting of a full hearing to appellants, with adequate representation by counsel, upon the mere presentation of a verified petition would crowd the court dockets and work hardship on the state courts and State's Attorneys. Neither of these factors,
however, in any way justifies the obstacles which stand in the way of all
post-conviction hearings. These procedural barriers operate automatically
without distinguishing the meritorious petitions from the bad ones.
Solution of the problem will not be an easy task. First, either the legislature or the Supreme Court will have to enlarge the scope of one or more
of the presently available remedies, since certain allegations which set
up unquestionable violations of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment cannot be reviewed by habeas corpus, writs of error, or
coram nobis motions as those procedures now exist in Illinois. The simplest
reform would be a retreat from the stand taken in the Swolley case; the
Court might broaden the applicability of habeas corpus to include nonjurisdictional problems or, better still, might hold that any conduct
which deprives the accused of due process of law destroys the jurisdiction
of the trial court to enter judgment. 99 Another possibility would be the
expansion of the coram nobis motion to include review of facts which
were within the knowledge of the trial court at the time of trial, if those
facts constitute a denial of due process. If the availability of the motion
were made generally known to prisoners, the five-year limitation period
would cause less difficulty, so that legislative action might not be necessary. Whichever method might be selected, the limited review available
98 Lee Van Woods (see Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211 [1946]) has been in court nine
*times without securing a hearing on the merits of his allegations, . nd has now applied for a
writ of habeas corpus to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
John Rooney (see United States ex rel. Rooney v. Ragen, r58 F. 2d 346 [C.C.A. 7 th, 1946],
cert. den. 67 S. Ct. 1532 [1947]) required only seven petitions to exhaust his state remedies
since his fourteen years' imprisonment eliminated the need to seek relief in coram nobis pro-

ceedings.
99Johnson v. Zerbst, 3o4 U.S. 458, 468 (1938); see petitioner's brief at 14, Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211 (1946).
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on writs of error would lose its significance. If Illinois state courts furnished effective machinery for post-conviction hearings, the necessity of
seeking writs of error as a prerequisite to relief in the federal courts would
vanish.
Once a method has been provided for hearing all claims of violation of
constitutional rights in criminal proceedings, means must be established
to prevent the glutting of the courts with fabricated or insufficient petitions. One possibility would be to refer all petitions to the public defender,
or other counsel in a capacity as friend of the court.' This requirement
would be useful not only in withdrawing a heavy burden from the courts,
but also in aiding the petitioners to stay out of procedural pitfalls10° The
friend of the court, assuming all the allegations to be true and interpreting
02
the petition liberally as required by the United States Supreme Court,
should advise the court of his opinion, as to the sufficiency of the petition.
If the court then finds that the petition fails to state a cause of action or
that the wrong remedy has been chosen, it should grant the state's motion to dismiss the petition, but it should be required to state the grounds
upon which dismissal is based.
If, on the other hand, the allegations establish a prima facie valid case
for relief, the courts might adopt, in modified form, the requirement set
up in the Tuohy case: appellant should be required to file supporting affidavits sworn to by any witness whose testimony would be required to
establish petitioner's claim. After the state had filed answering affidavits,
the court might determine whether the affidavits would justify the giving
of a full hearing to petitioner. Such a selective weeding-out process, which
zoo Unfortunately, mere representation of the prisoner by appointed counsel is not enough
to insure that the Court will give the petition adequate consideration. Thus, petitioner Van
Woods sought coram nobis in the Criminal Court of Cook County in July, 1945, alleging inadequate representation by counsel and use of a coerced confession at his trial. The allegations
were later held to establish a clear denial of due process in Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S.
211 (1946). The petitioner was represented by the chairman of the Chicago Bar Association
Committee for Defense of Prisoners, yet the "hearing" consisted only of the following:
Counsel: He is asking a writ of coram nobis. He was not given advice as to the correct plea
and all of that, all of which was unknown to him at the time. He sets up in the petition he was
under the influence of narcotics.
The Court: Leave to file the petition for coram nobis without costs. Petition dismissed.
10 The fllinois Supreme Court has ruled that where a prisoner has been sentenced for an
erroneous term, he must be resentenced and serve his new sentence without credit for time
served under the erroneous term, unless the trial court chooses to diminish the new sentence
accordingly. Thus the prisoner seeking review may only succeed in obtaining a resentence
which, added to the time already served, is longer than the original erroneous sentence. This
unjust rule was applied last term in People v. Heard, 396 Ill. 215, 71 N.E. 2d 321 (X947);
People v. Judd, 396 Ill. 211, 71 N..E. 2d 29 (i947); and People v. Starks, 395 Ill. 567, 71 N.E.
2d 23 (i947). Such results might have been avoided had prisoners been advised by counsel.
102 Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 276 (i945); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485,487 (1945).
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is similar to one approved by the United States Supreme Court, 0 3 should
certainly fulfill the requirements of due process.
Whatever plan is finally adopted, there can be no doubt that now
is the time for the Court to take some affirmative action to remedy a very
unhealthy situation. For the most part, the Court's decisions during the
1946-47 terms only raised higher the procedural barrier behind which the
Court shelters itself from the spectacle of criminal appellants vainly seeking post-conviction hearings. Until the problem is met by providing means
for such hearings, the change in Illinois prison rules which allowed petitions to be sent out of the penitentiary must be regarded, at best, as a
4
mixed blessing.10
C. PUBLIC LAW

Approximately 23 per cent of the cases decided during the last year involved questions of public law.Io s The more important can be classified in
a few categories: constitutional law, taxation, and law of local government
bodies. Of these the most widely debated were three constitutional law
cases. People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School District No.
71106 involved the Champaign Board of Education's action permitting
church-financed religious instruction of public-school children. Instruction was given during school hours and in school buildings, upon the written request of the parents of the children concerned. The plaintiff, a taxpayer and parent of a child attending a district public school, sought mandamus to compel discontinuance of such instruction on the ground that it
violated Article II, Section 3 of the Illinois Constitution." °7 The trial court
denied the writ, and the Supreme Court affirmed the denial.
The Court held that no prohibition of the free exercise of religion was
involved in the program since participation was voluntary. According to
the Court, the stigma attached to non-participation was not compulsion.0
"03 Hysler

v. Florida, 3r5 U.S. 411, 415-17 (1942).
United States ex rel. Bongiorno v. Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973, 975 (I1. ,1944), aff'd r46
F. 2d 349 (C.C.A. 7th, I944), cert. den. Bongiorno v. Ragen, 325 U.S. 865 (1945), petitioner
104In

secured a hearing on the merits of his claim with only one petition, since the complete absence
of available remedies in Illinois courts gave him access to the federal courts. For prisoners
who could reach the federal district court by any method, relief was thus far speedier than
under the present "more liberal" rule.
lsSee Table 5, at 171 infra.
06*396 Ill. 14, 71 N.E. 2d x61 (1947), cert. granted 6 7 S. Ct.
"07 "The

1524 (1947).

free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall forever be guaranteed, and no person shall be denied any civil or political right,
privilege, or capacity, on account of his religious opinions." Ill. Const. Art. II, § 3.
108 People ex rel. Latimer v. Board of Education of Chicago, 394 Ill. 228, 68 N.E. 2d 3o5
(1946) sustained the constitutionality of an arrangement whereby children were excused from
school to attend religious education classes.
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People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education,1
invalidating a daily classroom
program involving Bible-reading and prayer, was distinguished on the
basis that participation in that program was required of all pupils. And because the expense of the program to the taxpayers was found to be limited
to wear and tear on furniture and floors, it was held to fall within the de
minimis doctrine, and, therefore, not to violate the Illinois constitutional
provisions guaranteeing free exercise of religion and prohibiting payment
of-public funds for religious purposes."
There is a division of opinion in state courts on the constitutionality of
Bible-reading programs similar to the one struck down in the Ring case.!11

The difficulties surrounding this subject are abundantly illustrated in the
recent school-bus case before the United States Supreme Court.' But
these difficulties were largely ignored by the Illinois Court in the McCollum case. For example, there was no investigation of whether participation is really voluntary in a program supported by both the prestige of the
state, operating through the public school, and the social pressure of attendance by every child but the plaintiff's. Nor was there any inquiry as
to whether the de minimis maxim is properly applicable to an absolute
prohibition involving the delicate church-state relationship.
Although of less general legal interest, two cases this term involving
veterans' rights immediately concerned the layman. The constitutionality of the Illinois veterans' bonus was upheld in Routt v. Barrettf,"3 a taxpayers' suit to enjoin state officials from disbursing public moneys to pay
the expenses of submitting the bonus bond issue to the electorate. By the
time the Routt case was decided, the bond issue had already been approved
by the voters. The Court did hear the constitutional issues, however,
after allowing the complaint to be amended.
This case and Bilek v. Chicago"4 present good examples of the present
expensive, time-consuming procedure for testing the constitutionality of
"09 245

IL. 334,

92

N.E. 251 (1910).

-0 "No person shall be required to attend or support any ministry or place of worship
against his consent, nor shall any preference be given by law to any religious denomination
or mode of worship." Ill. Const. Art. I, § 3. Neither the general assembly nor any.
school district .... shall ever make any appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever,
anything in aid of any church or sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school
... controlled by any church or sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any grant or
donation .... ever be made by ....
any such public corporation, to any church, or for any
sectarian purpose." Ill. Const. Art. VIHI, § 3- See cases cited in 5 A.L.R. 866 (i92o) supplemented in 141 A.L.R. x144 (1942).
,12Everson v. Board of Education, 33o U.S. 1 (1947).
113 396 Ill. 3 22, 71 N.E. 2d 66o (X947).
"14396 Il. 445, 71 N.E. 2d 789 (x947), holding invalid a superhighway bond issue.

A STUDY OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

proposed bond issues requiring approval by the people. By the time a case
is heard in the Supreme Court, the proposal will, in many cases, already
have been approved by the voters. If the issue should then be held invalid,
the time and expense of publication and submission to the voters will have
been wasted. Furthermore, if the subject is one on which rapid action is
desirable, the time already lost, plus the time required to resubmit the
question in a future general election in a form meeting constitutional requirements, may prove an insuperableobstacle to adequate timely legislation.
The constitutionality of other veterans' legislation was involved in
People ex rel. Jendrick v. Alman.1"s A 3945 amendment to the City Civil
Service Act contained a provision exempting war veterans from civil service discharge for misstatement of age.rS 6 Twenty-seven years is the maxi-

mum eligible age for police examination applicants. The 1945 amendment
seems to have been designed to circumvent this age requirement as far as
veterans were concerned. The petitioner was a World War I veteran discharged from a position as patrolman in Chicago for misstating his age on
his application for civil service examination. He brought a mandamus proceeding to compel the police commissioner to reinstate him in accordance
with the exemption stated in the act. The Court held the provision in
question unconstitutional in that it discriminated against persons without basing that discrimination on a reasonable distinction in circumstances. In 1914 the Court had upheld veterans' preference in Civil Service
positions." 7 However, according to another line of precedent there must
be some substantial difference between classes to justify preference, and
such difference must relate to the purpose of the act." 8 It seems clear that
a veteran who misstates his age is not more desirable as a public servant
than any other person making misstatements. The maximum age of twenty-seven apparently was set to promote efficiency, probably based on
length of potential service and on physical capabilities. Exemption of
veterans from this requirement, therefore, cannot be said to promote
efficiency on the police force. There is no inconsistency between allowing
a certain amount of public appreciation for war service and drawing the
line short of unreasonable and inefficient privileges.
Of far-reaching importance to the preservation: of Illinois land are cases
".396

ll. 35, V' N.E. 2d 44 (1947).
n6fl1. Rev. Stat. (x94s) c. 241, § s1.
People ex rel. Sellers v. Brady, 262 f11. 578, ios N.E. z (19x4).
v. Linde, 341 Ill. 269, 173 N.E. 361 (x93o); Wintersteen v. National Cooperage &
Woodenware Co., 361 Ill. 95, 197 N.E. 578 (1935).
n7

Is People
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involving the constitutionality of legislative attempts to compel individual
property owners to use their land in such a way as to conserve the state's
resources. One such statute was struck down during the 1946-47 session
in Northern Illinois Coal Corp. v. Medill.' 9 Suit was brought to enjoin the
Director of Mines and Minerals from enforcing provisions of an act requiring operators engaged in "open cut" or "strip" coal mining to restore
the land to approximately its original contour. 20 The Court held that the
statute was not a true public health or conservation measure and hence
was unconstitutional as an invalid exercise of the police power.
The Court's reason for holding that the statute was not a public health
measure, tending to eliminate breeding places for bacteria and mosquitoes,
was that the statute required restoration of the original contour of the
land. Thus, argued the Court, if the land originally contained pools or
swamps, such features presumably would also have to be restored. The
Court cited cases holding that property rights may not be invaded under
the guise of protection of public health when that is not the purpose of the
regulation.'' It found that the testimony of two witnesses that the water
in the pools in the open cuts would sustain life and breed bacteria and mosquitoes, like any other stagnant water, was insufficient evidence to show
that the public health was endangered. The Court also indicated that even
if the regulation were a valid exercise of police power, it would be invalid
in this case as an unreasonable discrimination against coal "strip" mine
operators, as compared, for example, with quarry owners. There was no
discussion of the prevalence of the coal "strip" mining wastes as compared
with quarry wastes, nor was there any inquiry into the practical difficulties
of restoring the original contour of rock quarries. Since in Illinois, coal
"strip" mining creates the major problem, and since the material for filling is on hand, the legislature seems to have made no unreasonable distinctions between classes. And reasonable distinctions between classes
can be made in the exercise of the police power. In this case, since the
practical problem is almost synonymous with coal "strip" mining, the distinction would appear quite reasonable.
A statute permitting the City of Chicago to issue slum-clearance bonds
and levy taxes to pay for them-z was upheld in a second land case, People
ex rel. Tuohy v. Chicago.x 3 Here, a quo warranto proceeding attacked the
219397 Ill. 98, 72 N.E.

2d 844 (i947).

-0Ill. Rev. Stat. (x945) c. 93, §§ z62-8o.
Il Bailey v. People, 19o 1ll. 28, 6o N.E. 98 (igoi); People v. Carolene Products Co., 345
Ill. 66, 177 N.E. 698 ('93').

Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) C. 24, §§ 23-103.1.

"' 394 Ill. 477, 68 N.E. 2d 761 (1946).
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statute on the theory that it attempted to empower a municipality to acquire private property for other than public purposes. The Court deemed
rehabilitation of slum areas a public use within the meaning of the constitution even though the leasing or sale of such areas to private persons was
contemplated. The decision, a logical extension of Zurn v. Chicago,124paves
the way for extensive improvements in housing conditions in Illinois, both
through direct state action and through state grants of power to municipalities.
That tax exemption is available for municipal airports is indicated by
People ex rel. Lawless v. Quincy.12s Local taxing bodies sought a judgment
and order of sale for delinquent taxes on an airport owned by the City of
Quincy but situated several miles outside the city. The city alleged that

the airport was tax exempt under the Revenue Act of

1939.12

A majority

of the Court held that the airport was used for public purposes under Subsection 9.The parties, however, had argued the case solely under Subsection 6. Two judges, specially concurring, pointed out that, under the ejusdem generis rule of statutory interpretation, Subsection 9 should be applied only to kinds of things similar to those enumerated, namely market
houses and public squares. They said, however, that the airport would be
tax exempt under Subsection 6, since they believed that it was used
exclusively for municipal purposes. Both the majority and the concurring
judges avoided the problem of defining an "exclusive municipal purpose,"
the former by basing the decision on Subsection 9 and the latter by merely
stating that an airport was used for such a purpose. It may be inferred that
since the Court agreed on tax exemption for two different reasons it is willing to use the act to provide a broad base for municipal tax exemption.-7
Situations may arise, however, where "public purposes" and "muncipal purposes" will have to be defined more precisely. Such a situation may
be presented by problems involving metropolitan areas. If, for example,
Chicago were to operate a metropolitan water supply system, with some
-4 389 Ill.
114, 59 N.E. 2d iS (1945). This case held that a law authorizing a private corporation to take private property for the redevelopment of slum and blighted areas authorized
a taking for a public use.

25395 Ill. 19o , 69 N.E. 2d 892 (1946).
x26 l1.

Rev. Stat. (I945) C. 120, § 500. The act provides for tax exemption in part as follows:

"(6) ....all proberty owned by any city or village outside of the corporate limits of the
same if used exclusively for municipal purposes .......
"(9) All market houses, public squares and other public grounds owned by a municipal
corporation and used exclusively for public purposes."
=7 Would not this case indicate, for example, that housing developments such as involved
477, 68 N.E. 2d 761 (io46). are tax exempt?
in People ex rel. Tuohy v. Chicago, 394 Ill.
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of the necessary property located outside the city, the "public purposes"
clause would almost surely not apply, since the use would be limited to
inhabitants of the city." 8 Sale of water to other communities would arguably not be a municipal purpose, and at least a part of such a project"29
might be subject to taxation. Thus a strict or liberal interpretation of
"exclusively municipal purposes" may have considerable influence on
future planning of metropolitan projects.
Another group of cases which received some public attention were those
involving the law of state and local government bodies. One of the most
difficult problems facing the Court in this group of cases stems from appeals seeking relief from rulings of government agencies. The Court recently has shown some tendency to refuse recognition of the validity of
legislative and administrative determinations and to substitute its own
judgment for that of a city council or board-equipped to handle the technical issues. This tendency is illustrated in 2700 Iiving Park BuildingCorp.
v. Chicago.130 The plaintiff in that case had purchased, in i94i, a fiftythree-acre tract of land for industrial purposes. The land bordering on the
tract had been and was both industrial and commercial. Most of the surrounding area, however, was residential. Before construction was started
by the plaintiff, the Chicago City Council passed a zoning amendment, 3'
which provided for the rezoning of a portion of the tract for apartment
usage. Subsequently a spot zoning amendment' s3 rezoned the entire tract

for apartment usage. The plaintiff brought suit to set aside the zoning
legislation as a taking of property without due process of law. On appeal,
the Supreme Court affirmed, the lower court's decision, holding the ordinances void with respect to the plaintiff's property.
The Court carefully pointed out that in determining the validity of rezoning ordinances, its inquiry is limited to whether the City Council had
authority to pass the ordinance and whether the ordinance has a reasonable relation to the public health, safety, and welfare, or is unreasonable or
arbitrary.133 Despite this dictum, the Court reasoned that since the "high=8 City of Mattoon v. Graham, 386 Ii. i8o, 53 N.E. 2d 955 (1944).
People ex rel. Lawless v. City of Quincy, 395 Ill. 190, 200, 69 N.E. 2d 892, 897 (1947).

129

Ill. 138, 69 N.E. 2d 827 (1946), noted in 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 718 (i947); d. also
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 39s Ill. 303, 7o N.E. 2d 64 (1946).
x3o395

Comprehensive
'3x
Amendment to the Chicago Zoning Ordinance ,Chicago Rev. Code
(1946) § i9 4 A.

Chicago Rev. Code (1946) § I 9 4A-I.
,3 395 Ill. 138, i49, 69 N.E. 2d 827, 831 (1946).
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est and best use'' 4 of the fifty-three acre tract was industrial,13s and inasmuch as the trend in the immediate neighborhood had been industrial for
two decades, the plaintiff should be allowed to use his property for manufacturing purposes. By setting up a standard for zoning legislation which
did not take into consideration the comprehensive problems of city planning, the Court not only usurped the function of the City Council in determining the best use of the land, but introduced serious obstacles in the
way of a much needed comprehensive rezoning plan for the City of Chicago. Similar revisions of zoning ordinances by the Court have occurred
before in Illinois.136
But the Court has in some instances quite vigorously upheld the administrative acts of zoning commissions. 37 In DeBartolo v. Oak Park,18
decided during the past term, the Court in upholding the enforcement of a
zoning ordinance of the Village of Oak Park said, "A zoning ordinance is
presumed to be valid. The burden is upon one assailing such an ordinance
to overcome this presumption. Where a general zoning ordinance is
passed, those who buy property in zoned districts have the right to rely
upon the rule of law that the classification made in the ordinance will not
be changed unless the change will be required for the public good."' 9 In
that case, a petition to convert a dwelling into a two-family apartment
building in a district zoned for single family uses had been denied. The
plaintiff contended that the zoning ordinance was unreasonable as applied
to her property because of the presence of multiple dwellings on the same
and adjoining blocks, 40 and because nearby property was zoned for commercial use. The contrast between the judicial technique used in this case
and that used in the Irving Park case is notable. In the DeBartolo proceeding, the Court emphasized the presumptive validity of zoning ordi234
For a discussion of the "best use" test, see 14 Univ. Chi.L. Rev. 718 (1947), noting the

instant case.
'3STwo expert witnesses testified to the effect that the best use of the land was industrial,
while two other experts maintained that it was residential.
' 6 Anderman v. Chicago, 379 11. 236, 40 N.E. 2d 51 (942); La Grange v. Leitch, 377 Ill.
99, 35 N.E. 2d 346 (941); Harmon v. Peoria, 373 11. 594, 27 N.E. 2d 525 (1940); Forbes v.
Hubbard, 348 Ill.
166, z8o N.E. 767 (1932).
137 Zadworny v. Chicago, 380 111. 470,44 N.E. 2d 426 (1942); Minkus v. Pond, 326 Ill.
467,
158 N.E. 121 (1927); Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill.
84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925). The cases are in accord with the approach of the United States Supreme Court in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926) and Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927).
'38 396 Ill.
404, 71 N.E. 2d 693 (1947).

139
Ibid., at 41o and 696.
z4OEvidence showed that these multiple dwellings had been constructed prior to the passage of the ordinance under attack by plaintiff.
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nances, which can be rebutted only if the opponent of the ordinance can
show that his constitutional property rights have been invaded, while in
the Irving Park opinion, primary stress was laid upon the freedom of
property owners to use their land as they desire, limited only by a reasonable exertion of the police power. The same principles were apparently asserted in each case. The manner in which the Court laid emphasis on one
or the other of two opposing concepts, however, determined the decisions,
while giving the impression that no difficult problem existed.
Other local government problems before the Court involved controversies arising from agreements between municipalities and private individuals. The most important of these cases was Yellow Cab Company v. Chicago,' 4' involving the contract rights of taxicab licensees. In 1934, the Chicago City Council had passed an ordinance providing for the issuance of
taxicab licenses. Of 4,100 licenses issued, the plaintiff Yellow and Checker
Cab companies received approximately 3,6oo. The ordinance provided

that the licenses issued were to be effective until i94o unless revoked sooner, that no further licenses were to be issued without a determination of
public necessity at a public hearing, and that if a licensee failed to operate
his cab for some reason within his control, his license could be revoked.
In 1937, the business recession made it necessary to reduce the number
of taxicabs on the streets. An ordinance was therefore passed providing
for voluntary surrender of taxicab licenses. In return for the surrender of
his license, a licensee was to have a thirty-day option to take up any new
license issued when the city determined that more taxicabs were needed.
Almost all of the licenses surrendered were given up by the plaintiffs.
The ordinance also extended the remaining licenses until 1945, when another ordinance was enacted renewing them until 1950.
As a result of their inability to replace automobiles and parts during the
war, the plaintiff companies were unable to operate a number of cabs
equal to the number of licenses held. Increased public demand for better
transportation stimulated the City Council to pass an ordinance in 1946
providing for the issuance of 250 "permits" for the operation of taxicabs.
These "permits" were to be distributed equally throughout the city,
with preference given to ex-servicemen. At the same time, the Public
Vehicle License Commissioner took steps to revoke the licenses of plaintiffs, unless the latter could put idle cabs back into operation within five
days. The present action was brought to enjoin such revocation of licenses
and also to restrain the issuance of "permits."
X4'396 Ill. 388, 71 N.E. 2d 652 (1947); cf. Branigar v; Village of Riverdale, 396 Ill. 534,
N.E. 2d2oI (1947).
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The city argued that the ordinances of 1934, 1937, and 1945 tended to
create a monopoly for the plaintiffs and were therefore void. The Court, in
ruling for the plaintiffs, held, in accord with Illinois precedents,41a that the
ordinances in question were irrevocable contracts between the city and
the licensees and that therefore the commissioner could not revoke the
licenses. The ordinance authorizing the issuance of permits was declared
invalid since it did not attempt to bring the new cabs and drivers under
the same regulations as the other taxicabs in the city, nor did it provide
for a termination of those "permits" when the original taxicab licensees
would be able to furnish the service which the public required. It is apparent under the latter holding that the immediate need for more taxicab
service in the city could have been met by appropriate amendment to the
"permit" ordinance. But the question of monopoly would still be present,
since the permit-holders would have to leave the field once the plaintiffs
could meet the physical demands for service. The Court in rejecting the
city's contention that the ordinances tended to create a monopoly, relied
on Capitol Taxicab Company v. Cermak,X42 involving a Chicago ordinance
similar to that passed in 1934. There, it was held that since the city had
reserved the right to issue new licenses after public hearings and a showing
of public necessity without obtaining consent from previous licensees, no
monopoly was created.
Theoretically this right remained unchanged after the contract ordinance of 1937, but it is not so clear that the provision had any practical
value after the grant of an option to the plaintiffs. The city would have
had to issue almost a thousand licenses to this group, increasing the city's
cabs by more than a third, before it could begin issuing licenses to potential competitors. It would also require several hundred more licenses before the newcomers could become numerous enough to offer effective competition. In view of the 1937 depression experience, illustrating the dangers
to public safety of too large a number of competing cabs, such action by
the city seems unlikely. The Court recognized these practical results of
the passage of the 1937 "option" ordinance, but it ruled that no monopoly
was created, since the ordinance was of general application and within
the power of the city to enact.
A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court has recognized
the monopolistic character of the Chicago taxicab situation, while ruling
x41SPeoria Railway Co. v. Peoria Railway Terminal Co., 252 11. 73, 90 N.E. 689 (19i);
People v. Blocki, 203 Ill. 303, 67 N.E. 8og (i9o3); Chicago v. Oak Park Elevated R. Co.,

250 Ill. 486, 95 N.E. 456 (igY.).

x42
6o F. 2d 6o8 (D.C. ll., x932).
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that no cause of action was stated under the Sherman Act, since local
43
taxicab service did not involve interstate commerce.1
Also within the category of Public Law is a group of taxation cases. Although none of these cases is in itself of great importance, together they
are indicative of the Court's approach to difficult problems of statutory
construction. Most of the Court's tax work is limited to considering narrow technical objections to the methods of administering the archaic Illinois general property levy. 44 Numerous cases strike down exercises of the
taxing power not meticulously conforming to the statutes. In a few cases,
however, where the interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions
raises questions substantially affecting taxation procedure and revenue
returns, the Court diligently inquired into and furthered the legislative
purpose.
An example of a case in which the Court's decision hinged on a trivial
defect is Saline Branch DrainageDistrict v. Urbana-ChampaignSanitary
District, 45 in which it was held that a judgment confirming a special as-

sessment against the "U. & C. Sanitary Dist." violated the constitutional
provision that judicial proceedings. be in the English language because the
quoted phrase is not "intelligible to a person understanding the English
language without other knowledge." People ex rel. Anderson v. Chicago
& N.W.R. Co. 46 was a similar case, involving the question of compliance by a city council with the requirement of a recordation of the vote
of each council member by yeas and nays. The record showed: "Voting
Aye 5. Nay none. Carried." In insisting that the vote of each member be
recorded by name, the Court stated that it could not "indulge the speculation ... . that the five members of the council noted as present were the
five voting aye" ! The council consisted of only five members.
In People ex rel. McWard v. Wabash R. Co. 47 the Court held that a c.ertified copy of the tax levy ordinance and not the original copy must be
filed with the county clerk. If the document upon which the county clerk
243

United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 S. Ct. 156o (1947).

144 Objections are usually raised by railroads which have enough at stake as large taxpayers to justify the costs of the suits. People ex rel. Hargrave v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.,
394 Ill. 471, 68 N.E. 2d 768 (x946); People ex rel. McWard v. Wabash R. Co., 395 Ill. 243,
7o N.E. 2d 36 (1946); People ex rel. Goodman v. Wabash R. Co., 395111. 520,7o N.E. 2d 718
(1947); People ex rel. Schlaeger v. Riche, 396 Ill. 85, 7z N.E. 2d 333 (1947); People ex rel. Wilson v. Illinois Central R. Co., 396 Ill. 510, 72 N.E. Ad 330 (947); People ex rel.Prindablo v.
New York Central R. Co., 397 Ill. 50, 72 N.E. 2d 821 (x947).

14S395 Ill. 26, 69 N.E. 2d 251 (1947).
146.396 Ill. 466, 71 N.E. 2d 701 (1947).

X47395 Ill. 243, 70 N.

. d 36 (x946)
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bases his authority for extending the tax purports on its face to be the
original ordinance and not a copy thereof, the levy is void. 48 Even though
the document is in fact a copy, it cannot be amended by adding a certification to show that it is a certified copy and not the original.' 49 But if the
document filed appears on its face to be a copy even though not certified,
it may subsequently be amended by adding the necessary certification to
support the tax. s° The result is that in the statutory phrase "certified
copy" the Court puts emphasis upon "copy" and not upon "certified."
This emphasis only complicates tax procedure without adding to the taxpayer's protection, for it is clear that the fact of certification rather than
the fact of copying is what protects him. The filing of the original ordinance actually gives the taxpayer greater protection than filing a certified
correct copy, since the sole purpose of certification is to insure that the
copy is a true one.
This decision, however, is in conformity with a line of Illinois precedents'5 ' all based upon one case. 5 2 But that case is distinguishable because
it involved the filing of an appropriation ordinance instead of a levy ordinance. Thus, a closer examination of the original precedent might have
avoided invalidating the tax on a purposeless technical ground.
On the other hand, where the issue was the interpretation of ambiguous
statutory provisions, the Court in two cases found the interpretation which
most reasonably fulfilled the legislative objectives15 3 The more important
was Anderson v. Park Ridgers 4 which required a construction of section
162(a) of the Revenue Act. 55 This section, setting the maximum and
minimum rates for the extension of 1946 taxes in all taxing districts in the
state with a population of less than 5ooooo, was part of a comprehensive
legislative plan to cure the flagrant lack of uniformity caused by the longestablished practice of locally assessing property at less than its full value.
248 C., L, & W. R. Co. v. People, 213 Il. 197, 72 N.E. 774 (19o4); Village of Russellville v.

Purdy, 206 Ill.

142,

68 N.E. io8s (1903).

People ex rel. Wangelin v. Picairn, 37i Ill. 6z6, 21 N.E. 2d 753 (1939); People ex rel.
Riche v. C, & E. I. R. Co., 315 IIl. 424, 146 N.E. 499 (1925); People ex rel. Carrv. Chicago &
N. W. R. Co., 312 Ill. 58, x43 N.E. 46o (1924); People ex rel. Daugherty v. Wabash R. Co.,
256 I1. 329, 1oo N.E. 261 (1912).
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xsoPeople v. Patten, 287 Ill. 392, 122 N.E. 471 (1gg); People v. Kankakee and Seneca
R. Co., 256 Ill. 419, oo N.E. 254 (1912).
-szCases cited notes r48-50 Supra.
- Village of Russellville v. Purdy, 2o6 I1. 142, 68 N.E. zo85 (19o3).
'53 People

ex rel. Hutchcraft v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 396 Ill. 502,
(1947); Anderson v. Park Ridge, 396 II. 235, 72 N.E. 2d 2ro (1947).
S4.396 flI. 235, 72 N.E. 2d 2XO (1947).
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The legislation required all counties to assess at ioo per cent and, then,
in order to prevent substantial increases in tax collections, reduced maximum tax rates 50 per cent. The combination of an increase in assessments
to ioo per cent and a reduction in rates to 50 per cent left those counties
which had previously assessed at 50 per cent with the same taxing power,
those which had previously assessed at less than 50 per cent with more taxing power, and those which had previously assessed at more than 50 per
cent with less taxing power.
Section 162(a) attempted to remove this variation by fixing in paragraph i a minimum amount extendable and by limiting in paragraph 2 the
tax rate to 15 per cent more than a formula maximum, "provided that in
no one year during aforementioned five-year period shall the tax extension
be increased to exceed 5 per cent of the maximum extendable in 1942." A
literal reading of the proviso appears to indicate that the amount of revenue to be raised under paragraph 2 could not exceed by more than 5 per
cent the maximum amount that could have been raised in 1942. The taxpayer urged this interpretation, but the city argued that the proviso only
limited paragraph 2. The Court, however, more reasonably interpreted
the proviso to mean that the 15 per cent increase in rates stipulated in
paragraph 2 was limited so that the increase in revenue in any one year
which could be raised by the increase over the formula rate could not exceed 5 per cent of the maximum tax extendable in 1942. This decision permits a gradual increase in tax extensions during the five-year period,
whereas the interpretations of either the city or the taxpayer would have
permitted an abrupt increase in collections at the end of the period.
D. PRIVATE LAW

As has already been indicated, a relatively small percentage of the litigation reaching the Illinois Supreme Court last term was between private
parties. Moreover, more than half of the cases between private parties
involved property; fewer than 2 per cent were concerned with commercial
relations, and fewer than 4 per cent with tortsxs 6 None of the tort cases'5 7

or of the commercial casesr 8 made any important changes in Illinois law.
Nor did any of them indicate a significant trend in the Court's approach
6

zS See Table 5, at 17r infra.
XS7Schneiderman v. Interstate

Transit Lines, Inc., 394 Ill. 569, 69 N.E. 2d

293 (1946);

Zitnik v. Burik, 395 Ill. 182, 69 N.E. 2d 888 (x946); Miller v. Miller, 395 II. 273, 69 N.E. 2d

878 (1946); Westinghouse Electric Elevator Co. v. LaSalle Monroe Building Corp., 395 Ill.
429, 70 N.E. 2d 604 (1946).

1SS
Mills v. Susanka, 394 Ill. 439, 68 N.E. 2d 904 (1946); Dean v. Kellogg, 394 Ill. 495,
68 N.E. 2d 898 (i946); Henrys v. Raboin, 395 Ill. 118, 69 N.E. 2d 49x (1946); Doggett v.
North American Life Ins. Co., 396 Ill. 348, 71 N.E. 2d 69o (1947).
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to these kinds of problems. Similarly, the trust casess 9 during the last year
cannot be said to have effected any change in Illinois trust law. In most of
them, the Court was required to sift conflicting testimony and then apply
well-known principles to the determined facts.
The significant cases in this section fall into four categories: real property, wills and probate, family relations and divorce, and labor. All of the
labor cases last year involved claims under the Workmen's Compensation
and Unemployment Compensation Acts. Although, strictly speaking, they
are not litigations between private parties, nevertheless, the issues in these
cases always involve a conflict between employee and employer over their
respective rights under state labor statutes.
Because of the direct review of right in freehold cases the Supreme
Court's attention in real property litigation is often preempted by trivial
issues complicated only in their facts. The most significant and disturbing
of the few important decisions was Wloczewski v. Kozlowski. 16° There, the
prospective vendors employed a real estate dealer to find a purchaser for
their property. Since the plaintiff, the would-be purchaser, preferred to remain anonymous, the real estate dealer suggested that a clerk act as agent
and that the purchaser remain an undisclosed principal. The purchaser
orally consented to this arrangement, and a contract was drawn by the
real estate dealer and signed by the vendors and the agent. When the
vendors repudiated the contract, the agent, later joined by the purchaser
as real party in interest, sued for specific performance. The Court denied
relief, assigning as one reason the real estate dealer's duplicity in acting
for both vendor and purchaser without fully disclosing the details of his
dual agency. Thus confined to the narrow facts of the case, the decision
is in line with the authorities. 6' The Court, however, emphasized two
other grounds, and in so doing increased the confusion in Illinois law relating to mutuality and undisclosed principals.
Applying what it called a "settledprinciple of equity," the Court stated
that since the vendor would have been barred by the statute of frauds
from enforcing the oral contract between the undisclosed principal and
d 321 (1946); Harrison v. Kamp, 395 Ill. ii,
159 Belleson v. Ganas, 394 Il. 557, 69 N.E.
69 N.E. 2d 261 (1946); Dyer v. Paddock, 395 Ill. 288, 7o N.E. 2d 49 (x946); Stough v. Brach,
395 I1. 544, 7o N.E. 2d 585 (1946); Scherman v. Scherman, 395 Ill. 574, 71 N.E. 2d i6 (1947);
Houdek v. Ehrenberger, 397 Ill. 62, 72 N.E. d 837 (947); Kane v. Johnson, 397 EL. 112, 73
N.E. 2d 321 (1947).
i6o 395 Ill. 402, 7o N.E. 2d 56o (1946).
16'XVrobel v. Wojlasiek, 341 Ii. 330, 173 N.E. 348 (193o) and cases cited in 48 A.L.R. 917
(1927).
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the agent, the purchaser was barred by the doctrine of mutuality from
asserting a claihV on the contract. Of the three authorities cited by the
Court for the "settled principle," two were decided primarily on other
grounds. 6' The value of the third6 3 as a precedent is questionable since it
was ignored in a later case, on the same point, reaching a contrary result., 64
The latter case was not cited in the instant opinion. Moreover, most commentators and many courts now agree that the doctrine of mutuality requires only that the court be able to grant complete relief to both parties.' 6s In the instant case, since the chancellor had ordered an assignment
from the agent to the purchaser and the sale was for cash, the requirements
of the doctrine could be satisfied. Finally, the line of decisions granting
specific performance to a purchaser under a land contract signed only by
the vendor 66 argue by analogy for granting specific performance here. The
decision in the instant case, unfortunately, has added to the difficulty of
the appellate judge who, referring to the doctrine of mutuality, once com67
plained that "the decisions are not easy to harmonize."'
More far-reaching and practical effects may result from the third
ground of the Court's decision. If followed, it would render the use of
"straw men" in land transactions a perilous undertaking. Citing Cowan v.
Curran,68 the Court said that specific performance was there denied because an undisclosed principal cannot sue where "exclusive credit" is
given the one represented to be the purchaser. The Court then said that
"in the same case we held in a contract of sale of real estate one has a right
to determine with whom he will deal, and a failure to disclose an unknown,
undisclosed principal is ground for denying specific performance." 6 9 The
holding that an undisclosed principal cannot sue where exclusive credit
has been given to another is on its face much narrower than the proposition that failure to disclose an unknown principal is ground for denying
162 Cummins v. Martzen, 273 111.45, iiN.E. 347 (1916); Jacksonville Hotel Bldg. Corp. v.
Dunlap Hotel Co., 350 Ill. 451, i83 N.E. 397 (1932).
z63Lunt v. Lorscheider, 285 Ill. 589, 1 21 N.E. 237 (1918).

164Lewis v. McCreedy, 378 Ill. 264, 38 N.E. 2d 170 (1941).
16s Stone, The "Mutuality" Rule in New York, i6 Col. L. Rev. 443, 446 (1916).
66

z

U]lsberger v. Meyer, 217 Ill. 262, 75 N.E. 482 (i9o5); Gradle v. Warner,
iii8 (x892); Estes v. Furlong, 59 Ill. 298 (187).

140 Ill. 123,

29 N.E.

167Ellis

Electrical Laboratory Sales Corp. v. Ellis, 269 Ill. App. 417, 426 (1933).
Ill. 598, 75 N.E. 322 (i9o5). There the contract called for the advancement of six
months' credit on a substantial part of the purchase price. The contract appeared to be signed
by a Mrs. Kane, but, unknown to the vendor, Mrs. Kane's name had been signed by the defendant, the real party in interest.
168 216

"' 395 Ill.

402, 406, 70

N.E. 2d 56o, 562 (1946).
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specific performance. Not one of eight foreign cases cited supports the
proposition,170 and one was overruled on a second appeal.'7 ' Moreover,
the Court in applying the narrower holding of the Cowan case apparently
overlooked an essential fact. "In the present case," the Court said, "the
contract was signed by Isabelle Ostrowski, and so far as appears sole credit
was given to her by [the vendors]."172 A scrutiny of the contract discloses
that not only was assignment contemplated but that the transaction was
to be on a cash basis.'17 It is to be hoped that the passage of time will not
convert the Court's comments on the law of undisclosed principal into
ratio decidendi. The use of straw men in land transactions is well settled
in law and in business custom and is often the only way in which large
corporations and governments can buy land without paying exorbitant
prices.
The same lack of sensitivity to commercial needs was displayed in
Ainbarann,Corp. v. Old Ben Corp.74In that case, one Sinks, who originally
held title to the land in controversy, conveyed the "coal, oil and gas" to
the defendant, and later conveyed the property to the plaintiff's grantor,
"saving and reserving all coal, oil and mineral rights as heretofore transferred to [the defendant]." The question at issue was the admissibility of
usage evidence to prove that the words "coal, oil and gas" meant, in the
locale in which the transaction took place, "coal, and all the oil and gas
within the coal." The Court held that the surface owner was estopped to
deny the recital of the reservation in the deed from his grantor and extrinsic evidence was inadmissible to prove that the intention of the parties
was different from the "unambiguous" words. In doing so, the Court
ignored the distinction between usage, which, according to most authorities, may always be admitted to explain even the most unambiguous language, and evidence of a private intention of the parties, which is barred
by the parol evidence rule. The possible hampering effect of such an exclusionary rule in a great commercial state, where "unambiguous" words
zo In four of the cases cited, specific performance was denied because of the agent's false
representations: White Tower Management Co. v. Taglino, 302 Mass. 453, 19 N.E. 2d 700
(z939); Gloede v. Socha, 199 Wis. 503, 226 N.W. 950 (1929); New York Brokerage Co. v.
Wharton, 143 Iowa 61, 119 N.W. 969 (i9o9); Winchester v. Howard, 97 Mass. 303 (1867). In
two, the defendant had previously refused to deal with the undisclosed principal: Siess v.
Anderson, '59 Mo. App. 656, 139 S.W. 1178 (191x); Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass. 28
(1877). Kane v. McClenachan, io4 Pa. Sup. 417, 159 At]. 61 (1932), turned on the agent's
duplicity. Kelly v. Thuey, 102 Mo. 522, iSS.W. 62 (189o), involved the advancement of

exclusive credit to the agent.
171Kelly v. Thuey, 143 Mo. 422, 45 S.W. 300 (1898).
172395

Ill. 402, 407, 7o N.E. 2d 56o, 562 (1946).

173 Abstract

of Record, at 77.

"74395

II. 154, 69 N.E.

2d 835

(1946).
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and phrases may frequently have curious mercantile definitions, is evident. The cited cases are generally inconclusive Ts and conflict with other
Illinois decisions more in pointYz16 In view of the inconclusiveness of the
authorities, it is unfortunate that the Court avoided this opportunity to
discuss the persuasive arguments in favor of admissibility advanced by
Wigmore 77 and Williston'18 and accepted in the Restatement of Contracts.' 9 The Court's discussion of both estoppel and usage may have
been dicta in view of the finding that, regardless of usage, the grantor
actually had intended to convey the oil and gas in the first deed. The
multiplicity of grounds for decision makes the Court's position on each of
these points uncertain.
In Pearson v. Adams"so the Court was called upon to reconsider previous decisions denying an abatement of part of the purchase price where
the vendor's wife refused to join in the deed. The Court has always taken
the position that the value of a wife's inchoate right of dower is not ascertainable, even by the use of mortality tables. The plaintiff, however,
pointed to a recent statute 8' providing for a proceeding to determine the
value of an outstanding inchoate dower right where real estate is sold on
execution, or in bankruptcy, foreclosure, or lien enforcement proceedings.
This, he argued, was evidence of a change in the public policy of the state
on the subject. Most American jurisdictions prefer valuation of the dower
interest to requiring the purchaser either to accept the deed without the
wife's signature and later sue on the covenants, or to pursue his remedy
at law for breach of contract.' 82 But the Court had a brief answer to the
plaintiff's argument. "The statute relied upon singles out cases where
there are involuntary sales and makes no reference to transactions volun17SGilbert & Co. v. McGinnis, 114 Ill. 28, 28 N.E. 382 (1885), refused admission of evidence
of a custom to give notes for advancements on the sale of corn. Morton v. Babb, 251 Ill. 488,
96 N.E. 279 (19i) involved an attempt to alter the legal effect of a deed. The question of
usage did not arise in Decatur Lumber & Manufacturing Co. v. Crail, 35 o Ill. 319, 183 N.E.
228 (1932), Fowler v. Black, 136 Ill. 363, 26 N.E. 596 (i:89), or Ford v. Witwer, 383 Ill. SIr,
5o N.E. 2d 714 (1943).
176In Steedtman v. Joseph Lay Co., 234 Ill. 84, 84 N.E. 640 (i9o8), it was held error to
exclude evidence of usage to interpret the meaning of such phrases as "f.o.b. Ridgeville, Indiana," and "free at Ridgeville, Indiana." In Leavitt v. Kennecolt, 157 Ill. 235, 41 N.E. 737
(i895), an action for breach of contract to employ plaintiff "at a weekly salary of forty dollars
per week," it was held error to exclude evidence of a custom not to pay during the summer.
1779 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2462 (1940).
1783 Williston, Contracts

§§

609, 629 (1936).

Rest., Contracts §§ 246-48 (1932).
,go 394 Ill. 391, 68 N.E. 2d 777 (1946).
181Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 3, §189.
"82
See cases collected in 148 A.L.R. 292 (1944) and 46 A.L.R. 749 (1927).
'79
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tarily entered into by the parties. ' ' 1 The policy evinced by the statute
might be interpreted to proffer to the Court an opportunity to bring Illinois law into the majority fold. On the other hand, no one would argue
that the value of a particular dower right can be accurately determined.
The Court evidently believed that the necessarily arbitrary decision
should be made only in the situations set forth in the statute.
A tendency to require strict performance of a contract for the purchase of land is manifested in Johnson v. Riedler.181 The contract provided
for payment of the purchase price within five days after the title was
shown to be merchantable. A controversy developed as to the place of
payment and delivery of the deed and tender of the purchase money was
delayed until one month after the time stipulated. The Court held that
the plaintiff was not entitled to relief since he could not show that he had
fully performed his part of the bargain. In two of the cases cited by the
Court, time was made of the essence by the parties."x s A third involved a
lapse of performance of several years.x86 The present case thus goes further
than these authorities in requiring strict compliance with a contractual
provision as to time of performance where the parties have not made
time of the essence. In the remaining real property cases, the Court re5 7
asserted well-established rules and applied them to the facts presented?
Few of those cases were worthy of the attention of the highest judicial
body of the state.
Several administrative provisions of the Probate Act were considered
by the Court in the period under review. Two cases involved the situation
created in the Probate Court of Cook County by provisions of the Illinois
Constitution permitting only one probate court and one probate judge in
the county.," An unbearable burden is imposed upon this single judge by
the provision of the Probate Act requiring that each of the two attesting
1'3 394 Ill. 391, 399, 68 N.E.
184 395

2d

777, 78, (1946).

Ill- 412, 70 N.E. 2d 570 (1946).

ls Olson v. Forsberg, 332 Ill. 266, 163 N.E. 697 (1928); Mitchell v. White,

295

Ill. 135,

128 N.E. 8o3 (1920).

"8'Bennett v. Burkhalter,

257 Il. 572, 1o1 N.E. 189 (1913).
McCleary v. Lewis, 397 Ill. 76, 72 N.E. 2d 862 (1947); Spies v. De Mayo, 396 Il1. 255,
72 N.E. 2d 316 (1947); Bydalek v. Bydalek, 396 Ill. 65, 71 N.E. 2d ig (i947); Lewis v. Blumenthal, 395 Ill. 588, 71 N.E. 2d 36 (I947); Creighton v. Elgin, 395 Ill. 87, 69 N.E. 2d 501 (1947);
Rice v. United Mercantile Agencies, 395 Ill. 512, 70 N.E. 2d 618 (1946); Koslowski v. Mussay,
395 li. 81, 69 N.E. 2d 338 (x946); Schueler v. Blomstand, 394111. 6oo, 69 N.E. 2d 328 (1946);
Newman v. Youngblood, 394 Ill. 617, 69 N.E. 2d 3o9 (1946); Hesker v. Shaffer, 394 II1. 489,
68 N.E. 2d 612 (1946).
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witnesses to a will testify before the probate court prior to admission of
the purported will to probate18 9 As a result, the Cook County Probate
Court has adopted an expedient whereby the deputy probate clerk hears
the testimony of the subscribing witnesses, and the probate judge thereafter merely certifies a transcript of the testimony. In neither case did the
Court actually pass on the legality of this expedient. In the first,z9° the
Supreme Court reiterated its previous position that the validity of a probate court order may not be collaterally attacked in a will contest, 9'
pointing out that the right to contest a will exists only under Section go of
the Probate Act, 9 2 which does not authorize collateral actions attacking
the procedure admitting the will to probate. 93 In the second case, 94 a
petition for mandamus to compel the probate judge to expunge from the
records all entries pertaining to the admission of a will and codicils to
probate was held to have been properly denied. The extraordinary remedy
of mandamus could not be used to correct an allegedly improper procedure
when the probate proceedings were not void and when no reason was given
for the failure to object at the proper time and to appeal from the probate court's decision as provided by statute. 93 The Court had previously
refused to admit parol testimony contradicting similar certificates of the
probate judge where transcripts of the testimony of subscribing witnesses
96
taken in the probate court were offered as evidence in a circuit court.
The Court there made its position clear when it said, "If it was not taken
in open court, as she now contends the law requires, it was her duty then
to object.'1 97 While it is regrettable that the inaction of the legislature makes this extra-legal procedure necessary in Cook County, the
Court's decisions are well in line with long-established authority refusing

139
Ill. Rev. Stat. (i945) C. 3, § 221.
190 Kula v. Sitkowski, 395 Ill. 167, 69 N.E. 2d 688 (z946).
Shelby Loan & Trust Co. v. Milligan, 372 Ill. 397, 24 N.E. 2d 157 (i939); Dowling v.
113 N.E. 987 (xgx6).
192Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 3, § 242.
'91

Gilliland, 275 Ill. 76,
193

Section go of the Probate Act provides for an action"

...

to contest the validity of the

will ...... "I. Rev. Stat. (194s) C.3, § 242. The section was derivedfrom Section 7 of the Wills
an issue
Act of 1872 as last amended by Ill. L. 1935, P. 1442, § i, which reads in part ....
at law shall be made up whether the writing produced be the will of the testator or testatrix
or not .......
X94People v. O'Connell, 394 Ill. 409, 68 N.E. 2d 758 (x946).
19S Ill.

Rev. Stat. (1945) C.3, §§ 483, 484.

'9'Teter v. Spooner, 279 li. 39, iz6 N.E. 673 (I9M7); Wilkinson v. Service,
94 N.E. 5o (i"ii).
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to void a judgment for procedural defects when no appeal had been
taken.'1 8
Another question of procedural technique was raised in Dickman v.
99 in which a devisee under a will executed prior to the marriage
Frieling,1
of the testator and admitted to probate by a county court brought suit
for partition of the real property devised. The defendant, recognizing that
when a county court having jurisdiction admits a will to probate the decree is conclusive until set aside on appeal or by a judgment in a statutory
will contest, argued that when the testator remarried, the will was revoked
by Section 46 of the Probate Act°2 0 0 and that since there was no will, there

was no subject matter over which the probate court could exercise jurisdiction. The Supreme Court rejected this argument on the basis of previous decision°20I but did not make the obvious answer that a court with

probate jurisdiction has jurisdiction over all purported wills. The result,
which prevents the injection of a will contest into partition proceedings,
is supported by the policies which require that an end be brought to litigation and that security of tities be maintained.2
The Court also considered several cases during the last term involving
substantive provisions of the Probate Act. Bruce v. McCormick °3 raised
the question of the interest acquired by a surviving spouse before the expiration of the period provided for the perfection of dower in Section i9 of
the Probate Act. During this period, the widow of a decedent had executed
and delivered a quitclaim deed for a piece of land of which her intestate
husband had been the owner. The grantee conceded that under the old
Dower 0 4 and Descent Acts0 5 the vesting in the surviving spouse of an
undivided one-third fee interest in the real property was conditioned upon
specific waiver or failure to elect to take dower within the statutory period,
but claimed that the Probate code which repealed these earlier acts °6
vested an undivided one-third interest in fee in the survivor, subject to a
condition subsequent that she not perfect her right of dower within the
19SRex v. Justices of Leicestershire, x M. & S. 442 (1813); Penney v. Slade, 7 Scott 285

(C.P., 1839).

395 Ill.
383, 70 N.E. 2d 61 (1946).
00Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 3, § 197.
20, Bowen v. Allen, 13 Ill.
53 (1885); Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Brown, x83 Ill. 42,

55 N.E. 632 (I899).
v. Winter, 247 Ill. 243, 93 N.E. 145 (191o).
396 Ill. 482, 72 N.E. 2d 333 (1947).

202Dibble
203

Ill.
Rev. Stat. (I937) c. 41, § I.
20sIll. Rev. Stat. (i937) C.39, § 1.
204

206111.

Rev. Stat. (945) c. 3, § 500.
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permitted time. The Court held that Sections 11,20718 208 and i9,/9 merely
codified and simplified the corresponding provisions of the Dower and
Descent Acts, and that the widow had only an unperfected dower interest
which was not capable of being conveyed to a stranger to the fee.21 0 However, Sections ii, i8, and 19 of the Probate Act were intended to provide
that the survivor obtains a fee interest if he takes no action to perfect his
dower, instead of obtaining a dower interest if he fails to claim his intestate
share.2"' The Court has partially defeated the purpose of the legislation in
failing to read Sections i8 and i9 in the light of this important change.
The decision is also regrettable in that it immobilizes land in which dower
rights may exist and permits a surviving spouse to defeat his own conveyance.

Construing Sections 85 and 89 of the Probate Act in a statutory will
contest, the Court held in Sternbergv. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,"' that a

foreign will, insofar as it purported to devise Illinois real estate, was revoked by the marriage of the testator after execution of the will, although
the testator was a resident of another state and the will was admitted to
probate under the provisions of Section 85. Section 89 was interpreted as
intended only to protect the foreign will from collateral attack. A foreign
will is given the same status as a domestic will and although admitted
to probate it remains subject to direct attack. This result is supported by
traditional techniques of statutory construction. Section 89 provides that
"the admission to probate" of a foreign will "has the same effect in all respects as the admission to probate of a domestic will." The term "probate" is used in Article V of the act to refer to the provisional admission
by the probate court. The section in question follows in Article VI and
the legislature may have intended to use the term in the same manner.
Doubt is cast upon this result, however, by the fact that the term may
also mean the totality of the proceedings in which the effectiveness as a
will of a paper purporting to be a will is finally determined. This meaning
207 Section i i of the Probate Act provides that when there is a surviving spouse and also

a descendant of the decedent, the spouse takes one-third of each parcel of real estate in which
he does not perfect his right to dower. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 3, § 162.'
2o8Section i8 of the Probate Act gives the surviving spouse a one-third interest in all real
estate "unless the dower has been released or is barred." Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) C.3, § 170.
209 Section I9 of the Probate Act provides that the dower is barred unless perfected in a specified manner within ten months after the issuance of the letters of administration. Ill. Rev.
Stat. (i945) c. 3, § 171.
-0 O'Malley v. Deany, 384 Ill. 484, 5I N.E. 2d 583 (1943).

"1,
James, Illinois Probate Act Annotated 3' (194o).
2 394 Ill. 452, 68 N.E. 2d 892 (1946).
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includes the probate proceedings under Article V and the will contest combined. Since the only questions which might be raised in Illinois and not in
the foreign jurisdiction are those pertaining to formalities, and since those
limitations appear to be waived by Section 85, it seems strange that a
direct attack in a will contest is allowed. The Court did not discuss this
question.
In construing Section 96, which lists the priority for appointment of
members of various classes as administrators, the Court held that where
heirs (members of class five) are in such position that, if appointed administrators de bonis non, they would be opposing as individuals what they
were required to do as administrators, a probate court has jurisdiction to
determine that the statute giving heirs preferential rights of administration must yield to the paramount necessity of accomplishing substantial justice between the parties in interest by appointment of a disinterested third person at the request of creditors (class eight) .23 The Court
said,

"

.....

the statute neither expressly nor by implication confers an

absolute right on persons within one of the enumerated classes to be appointed administrator. "24 The fact that the heirs objected to the sale of
real estate in order to discharge debts was considered a sufficiently strong
adverse interest to make them unsuitable to administer, even though such
adverse interest is not specified in Section 94 as a disqualifying factor.
By holding that the disqualifications embodied in Section 95215 are not
exclusive, the Court reached a reasonable result and left open the possibility of recognizing similar considerations which may arise in the future
applications of Section 96.
Besides the problems arising under administrative and substantive sections of the Probate Act, the Court also considered several problems connected with decedents' estates which arose apart from the statute. The
cases on mental capacity and undue influence rely on earlier decisions to
defeat disinherited relatives clutching at legal straws to overthrow wills.2,6
The three cases dealing with construction of wills show the Court strug=1 In

re Estate of Abell, 395 Ill. 337, 70 N.E. 2d

Tid., at 346 and

214b

252 (I946).

256.

21s"A person is not qualified to act as administrator of the estate of any decedent if he is of
unsound mind or an adjudged incompetent under this Act or has been convicted of a crime
rendering him infamous or is a nonresident of this state, or, if a male, is less than twenty-one
years of age or, if female, is less than eighteen years of age. Any corporation qualified to accept and execute trusts in this state is qualified to act as administrator." Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945)
c. 3, § 2462x6 Schlachter v. Schlachter, 396 Ill. 184, 71 N.E. 2d 153 (1947); Challinger v. Smith, 396
Ill. io6, 7i N.E. 2d 324 (1947); Johnson v. Bennet, 395 Ill. 389, 69 N.E. 2d 899 (1946).
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gling to carry out the intent of the testators. In Geiger v. Geer217 the Court
stated that will construction decisions are necessarily limited to their own
facts and paid little attention to the available precedents in deciding the
case, whereas in Freudenstein v. Braden"8 the Court relied heavily on
earlier cases.
In a third case, Bozza v. First National Bank of Alton,2 9 the testator
devised an estate in trust to pay the income to his wife for life, and on her
death to pay income to his four children for life, and on the death of the
last of the four children to distribute the corpus to the testator's living
grandchildren and the descendants of any deceased grandchildren. The
testator's widow, children, and grandchildren brought suit to accelerate
distribution of the corpus on the grounds that the advanced ages of the
four children precluded the birth of more remaindermen. The Court refused to terminate the trust on the ground of the legal presumption of the
possibility of issue until death. The precedents utilized by the Court stem
from Hill v. Spencer,"° in which it was said as dictum, without citing
cases, that "the allegation that Martha Hill [the grantee] is past the time
of life to have children is meaningless, as she is, in law, presumed to be
capable of bearing children as long as she live, unless more than a mere
2
matter of age is stated in the bill.""'
It is likely that this dictum stems
from the cases involving the rule against remoteness of vesting."' If so,
the Bozza case postpones the vesting of a remainder by applying a rule
against the remoteness of vesting. Because of the dubious precedent, it is
unfortunate that the Court did not analyze the facts in the Bozza case in
an attempt to create a rational rule. It did attempt to base its decision
on policy considerations by saying that, although an irrebuttable presumption such as child-bearing capacity is not to be favored, a contrary rule
would encourage life tenants to undergo sterilization in an attempt to accelerate distribution. It is to be regretted that the doctrine on possibility
of issue has been carried over to new problems without more critical examinafion.
Of the few family relations cases reaching the Supreme Court last year,
the most important dealt with divorce. The Supreme Court in Conrad v.
Conrad223 held that a city court had jurisdiction to grant a default decree
"7

395 IlL. 367, 69 N.E. 2d 848 (1946).

-8397 Ill.
-9396

29, 72

- See Gray, The Rule against Perpetuities §
-

=0 196 Ill. 65, 63 N.E. 614
=Ibid., at 7o and 616.

N.E. 2d 832 (1947).

Ill. 569, 72 N.E. 2d 5i (947).

396 Ill. Io1, 7t N.E. 2d 54 (x947).
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(1942).

(1902).
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of divorce for desertion commencing outside the state, where the plaintiff
had resided in Illinois for more than a year and in the city for nearly a
year before filing the complaint. The decision is significant because it is
the first application to a divorce case of the rule of Werner v. Illinois Central R. Co.,22 4 which decided that under the Illinois Constitution22s and
Section x of the City Court Act, as then in force," 5 city courts have no
2

jurisdiction over causes of action arising outside the territorial limits of
the city. The action there was forpersonal injury under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, but the rule was stated to be of general application.
Determination of the place where a cause of action arises is not a factual, but a legal problem, frequently requiring application of artificial rules
such as those used in conflict of laws for determining the place of contracting or the place of harm. Generally it is said that a cause of action arises
at the time when, and at the place where, there occurs the last in the chain
of events constituting the operative facts upon which the law predicates
the cause of action. 227 Under this theory, a cause of action for divorce
arises when and where the last event happens which is necessary by
statute to entitle the plaintiff to a decree. Where, as in Illinois, at least
two acts of physical cruelty are required for a divorce on the ground of
extreme and repeated cruelty, the plaintiff's cause of action arises when
and where the second act is committed against him. Where an alleged
wrongdoer acts in one place but the harmful effect is felt in another, the
latter place is regarded by orthodox theory as the place of wrong."2
Thus in the Conrad case the Court held that the cause of action arose in
West Frankfort, where the plaintiff resided at the time the act of deser-4379

Ill. 559,

42 N.E.

2d 82

(1942).

-Sfll. Const. Art. VI, § z.
-6Ill.

Rev. Stat.

(1941) c.

37, § 333. This section was amended in

1943

to eliminate the

words "[The city court] shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court within the
city in ....[all] cases arising in said city" and to substitute "shall be courts of general jurisdiction in and for the dtieswherein theyare respectively established,in all .... cases ..... " Ill. L.
1943, at 578. A very recent case in an Appellate Court, Govan v. Govan, 73 N.E. 2d i63 (1947),
holds that the amendment eliminates the whole problem of the Werner case by omitting the
words "arising in said city." But the constitutionality of the amended statute so construed is
questionable. According to the discussions in the Werner case and in McFarlin v. McFarlin,
384 Ill.
428, 51 N.E. 2d 520 (1943), tracing the rule first laid down by People ex rel. Beebe v.
Evans, i8 Ill. 361 (1857), the words "in and for cities" under Art. VI, § i of the Constitution,
have consistently been interpreted as being equivalent to "arising in said city."
-7 Rest., Conflict of Laws §§ 31z-3i (1934); Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong, xg Tul. L.
Rev. 4 (944).
"8 Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, i So. 803 (1892); Worster v.
Winnipiscogee Lake Co., 25 N.H. 525 (1852); The Plymouth, 3 Wall. (U.S.) 2o (1865); United
States v. Davis, Fed. Cas. No. 14,932 (1837).
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tion became complete in Illinois, although the other party had never been
there. It would seem to follow that the plaintiff could sue in no other city
court, even if he should later become a resident of another city. Whether
a cause of action may be said to arise also where the acts or conditions
complained of were committed or begun is still an open question. For example, if a wife commits adultery in City A, while her husband resides in
City B, can he sue in City A? Or, if the second act of cruelty occurred in
City A although the parties resided in City B; could the suit be brought in
City A? Whatever the merits of this conceptualistic rule as to where a
cause of action arises, one may suspect that its adoption will create many
headaches in future litigation.229

In Olman v. Oilman 30 the Court reiterated the definition of condonation generally accepted in the United States, as a conditional forgiveness
of past offenses, the effect of which is to bar a suit for divorce based thereon.2 3' In this case the husband had left home after commission of the only

acts of cruelty alleged as grounds for divorce. Subsequently there was a
reconciliation and the parties cohabited, not happily but without violence,
for many months. The Court only followed the clear line of authority in
holding that the reconciliation and cohabitation constituted condonation 32 and that under the strict Illinois rule the subsequent bickering and
antagonism neither revived the old offense 33 nor amounted to new acts
34

of cruelty.
In the same case the Court clarified a point confused by dicta in
previous cases.2

35

Condonation was not pleaded as a defense, and all the

evidence of condonation was in the plaintiff's own testimony. Some courts
have held that condonation is an affirmative defense and must be pleaded
-9 For a study of the jurisdiction of city courts as it affects the current problem of Chicagoans seeking divorces in Calumet City see Divorce Cases in City Courts, 28 Chi. Bar Rec. 161

(1947).
I1. 176, 71 N.E. 2d 50 (1947).
Young v. Young, 323 11. 6o8, 154 N.E. 405

230 396

(1926); Abbott v. Abbott, 192 111. 439, 6x
N.E. 350 (1901).
232 Moore v. Moore, 362 Ill. 177, 199 N.E. 98 (1935); Abbott v. Abbott, 192 111.439, 61 N.E.
350 (igor); Duberstein v. Duberstein, 171 Ill. 133, 49 N.E. 316 (1897); Youngs v. Youngs,
130 Ill. 230, 22 N.E. 8o6 (i889).
233 Young v. Young, 323 Ill. 6o8, z54 N.E. 405 (1926); Abbott v. Abbott, 192 Ill. 439, 61
N.E. 35o (i9o); Farnham v. Farnham, 73 Il1. 497 (1879); cf. Lipe v. Lipe, 327 Ill. 39, 158 N.E.
23X

411

(1927).

N.E. 243 (igio); Fizette v. Fizette, r46 111.328,
34 N.E. 799 (1893); Wesselhoeft v. Wesselhoeft, 369 ll. 419, 17 N.E. 2d 56 (1938); Teal v.
Teal, 324 Ill. 207, 155 N.E. 28 (1927).
23S Lipe v. Lipe, 327 Ill. 39, 158 N.E. 4I (1927); Klekamp v. Klekamp, 275 Ill. 98, 113
N.E. 852 (1916).
234 Trenchard v. Trenchard, 245 Ili. 313,92
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as such2 36 But the cases show that this statement must be taken to mean
only that the defendant may not, as a matter of right, raise the issue of
condonation when the defense has not been pleaded. The Supreme Court
pointed out that in divorce suits, unlike most other civil actions, the state
is an interested third party, and that the court's duty therefore is to uphold the public policy in favor of preserving the marriage relation by denying divorce, regardless of procedural rules, if it appears that not all the
37
state's requirements for divorce are satisfied.2
All labor law cases decided during the 1946-47 terms involved claims
under the Workmen's Compensation and Unemployment Compensation
Acts by workers or their beneficiaries. No cases arose under the state antiinjunction act, nor did any case involve the legality of union activity.
The perennial problem of defining the scope of employment for purposes of workmen's compensation and unemployment compensation was
an issue in a number of cases in which the Court consistently opposed attempts by the compensation commissions and the lower courts to loosen
the limiting bounds of coverage. The decisions indicate a cautious conservatism in judicial interpretation of social legislation. In one case the
Court denied compensation on the ground that a fatal railroad injury had
not arisen out of the employment where a worker drove 65o feet out of
the way to check on the safety of his children.3 8 If the deceased had gone
home for lunch,239 or if he had returned to the employer's premises when
injured,240 or if the deviation had been a practice condoned by the employer,24r recovery probably would have been allowed. In another case,
2
where an employee was struck by a co-worker wielding a soup ladle, 4
the Court set aside his compensation award for the loss of an eye, stating
that the hazard of such an attack was not a risk incidental or peculiar to
the employment but was rather a risk common to the general public.
236 Wallace v. Wallace, II2 N.J. Eq. 292, x64 Atl. 565 (I933); Clark v. Clark, 143 Okla. 9 ,
287 Pac. 721 (1930); Tarr v. Tarr, 184 Va. 443, 35 S.E. 2d 4o1 (2945); Eldridge v. Eldridge,
278 Mass. 309, i8o N.E. i37 (i932); Nelson v. Nelson, 208 Iowa 713, 225 N.W. 843 (1929);
Blakely v. Blakely, 186 N.C. 351, 119 S.E. 485 (1923); Skinner v. Skinner, 47 Ind. App. 670,

95 N.E.

128 (IgII).

v. Johnson, 381 Il1. 362, 45 N.E. 2d 625 (1942); Winning v. Winning, 366 Ill.
57, 7 N.E. 2d 750 (1937); Decker v. Decker, 193 Ill. 285, 6i N.E. xio8 (19O).
238 Public Service Co. v. Industrial Coxnm'n, 395 II. 238, 69 N.E. 2d 875 (1946).
'37Johnson

"' Porter Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 3oi 11. 76, 133 N.E. 652 (1921).
24o Schafer v. Industrial Conim'n, 343 Ill. 573, 175 N.E. 789 (939).

Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 340 11. 68, I72 N.E. 52 (1930).
242Math Igler's Casino, Inc. v. Industrial Coam'n, 394 Ill. 33o, 68 N.E. 2d 773 (1946).
'4'
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However, had the petitioner's fellow employee swung the soup ladle playfully rather than maliciously, the Illinois Court probably would have held
that the injury arose out of the employment.243 While the Court apparently is willing to recognize that the work situation inspires man's natural
bent for play, it will not recognize that industrial life may similarly whet
aggressive feelings. A number of states have awarded compensation in assault cases, two on the ground that the employment exposed the worker
to the attack,244 and two others by inferring without specific evidence that
there was a causal connection between the work and the assault.24S
The Compensation Act provides that any right to receive compensation is extinguished by the death of the injured employee due to causes
other than the injury. But if, before the employee's death, an award is
determined for a specific loss, his dependents are entitled to the balance
remaining due.246 In a recent case-loss of sight was held to be such a specific loss,247 but in two other cases, because the award determination had
not been finally concluded by the commission before the employee's
death, the awards to the widows were set aside.241 The Court's approach
in these cases may perhaps be explained as a refusal to extend beyond its
narrowest limits a legislative concession antagonistic to the basic rationale
of workmen's compensation-that loss suffered because of the job should
be charged to the job. Allowing payment for a reduced earning potential
due to an incapacity caused by a work injury, after the incapacitated
claimant dies from another cause, amounts to paying for that part of a
potential loss which never actually materialized. The rationale more apparent in the decisions, however, is that if an award were to be made final
on the arbitrator's finding alone, the employer would be deprived of the
protective privilege of a commission hearing with the attendant medical
and testimonial examination of the claimant.
Another group of decisions during the 1946-47 sessions dealt with the
scope of review of Industrial Commission findings. Although the Supreme
,Court has plenary power to review such findings, three cases show the
Court's willingness to accept Commission determinations where there was
Cf. International Harvester Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 354 Ill. x5I, 187 N.E. 9x6 (1933).
244 Anderson v. Hotel Cataract, 17 N.W. 2d 913 (S.D., 1945); Ferguson v. Cady-McFarland
Gravel Co., 156 La. 87t, 1o1 So. 248 (7924).
24 York v. City of Hazard, 3o Ky. 3o6, 191 S.W. 2d 239 (1945); Grossberg v. H. & H. Taxi
Corp., 25o App. Div. 804, 294 N.Y. Supp. 201 (9,37).
24611. Rev. Stat. (I945) c. 48, § 145(e)(xg).
247 Mt. Olive & Staunton Coal Co. v. Industrial Conm'n, 394111377, 68 N.E. 2d 771 (1946).
248Neumann v. Industrial Comm'n, 396 Ill. 224, 71 N.E. 2d x68 (1947); Pullman-Standard
Car Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 396 Ill. 386, 71 N.E. 2d 697 (1947).
243
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conflicting testimony of medical experts as to the cause of the injury.249 In
these cases the Court says that it does not reverse the findings of the Commission "unless manifestly against the weight of the evidence," and appears to consider this rule equivalent to the usual substantial evidence
rule.2s° Yet in all cases except those where the Court prefers to stage the
battle of experts in another arena, judicial review of the findings of the
2
Industrial Commission has many of the aspects of a new trial. 1
Another general question considered by the Court was whether a claimant qualifies as an "employee" within the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. Although the statutory definition of "employee" is
broad in Illinois, the concept of the "independent contractor" remains a
vital and effective doctrine to defeat claims. In a recent case the Court
held that each case must be decided upon its own facts, with no one feature determinative of the relationship. 25 It did, however, emphasize that
the most important feature is the right of the employer to c6ntrol the
manner of work. The Court placed the burden upon the claimant to
establish, by a preponderance of evidence, "all the essential elements of a
contract of employment," including the fact that the worker was an
"employee" rather than an "independent contractor."'25 It is arguable
that a more apt comparison may be made with the treatment of whether
or not employment is "casual," in which case the burden has been placed
upon the compensation claimant to prove employment and injury, but
S4
on the.employer to prove that the employment was merely casual.2
When is a worker an "independent contractor" within the meaning of
the state Unemployment Compensation Act? Recent cases show that a
worker who might be considered ineligible for compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act as an independent contractor and not an
employee might easily be considered "in employment" for purposes of de249 Olin Industries v. Industrial Comm'n, 394 Ill.
593, 69 N.E. 2d 305 (1946); Cruthis v.
Industrial Comm'n, 394 Ill. So6, 68 N.E. 2d 744 (1946); Moergen v. Industrial Comm'n, 394
Ill.
383, 68 N.E. 2d 740 (1946).
2so Grola v. Industrial Comm'n, 388 I1. 114, 123, 57 N.E. 2d 373, 377 ('944).

- Stem, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges, and Juries, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 70,

89 (1944).
''Immaculate

Conception Church v. Industrial Comm'n, 395 Ill. 615, 71 N.E.

2d

70

(1947).

- Chicago Hardware Foundry Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 393 Ill. 294, 65 N.E. 2d 778
231, 48 N.E. 2d 938 (1943);
(1946); Western Cartridge Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 383 Ill.
Northwestern Yeast Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 373 Ill.
195, 37 N.E. 2d 8o6 (i94i); Borgeson
188, x3 N.E. 2d 164 (1938).
v. Industrial Comm'n, 368 Ill.
'S4Consumers Mutual Oil Producing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 289 Ill.
423, 124 N.E. 6o8
573, 120 N.E. 5o8
(i919); Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 284 Ill.
(ixi8).
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riving benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Act.2 ss That the
construction given the two acts seems inconsistent has been recognized
by the Court, and is justified by the differences in their basic purposes.56
But the real reason for differences in construction is the presence in the
Unemployment Compensation Act of specific standards defining the scope
of the Act.25 7 These were construed in Concrete MaterialsCorp. v. Gordons'
where the independent contractor issue turned on the application of the
statutory definitions.
The Unemployment Compensation Act denies benefits to workers unemployed because of a labor dispute.25 9 A walkout in objection to the refusal of the employer to accept the employees' interpretation of contract
provisions relating to vacation and portal-to-portal pay was held to result
in unemployment due to a labor dispute, and claims for unemployment
benefits were therefore refused.260 The argument for the claimants was
that in this case no labor dispute existed because the strike supported a demand for a benefit which had already been conceded. The Court rejected
this contention on the ground that such conduct came within the all-inclusive definition of a labor dispute under the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
E. PROCEDUE AND EVIDENCE

Only one procedure case and a few evidence cases decided during the
last year appear worthy of comment. Reiter v. Illinois National Casualty
Co.211 clears up an ambiguity and anachronism in the Civil Practice Act.26
In an action in equity the defendant moved to dismiss at the close of the
plaintiff's evidence. The trial court granted the motion, but the appellate
court reversed and remanded with directions to enter a decree for the
plaintiff .263 In an action at law on reversal and remandment the defendant would have had an opportunity to submit his evidence. But the ap2Ss Van Ogden, Inc. v. Murphy, 390 11. 133, 6o N.E. 2d 877 (x945); Peasley v. Murphy,
381 Ill. '87, 44 N.E. 2d 876 (1942); A. George Miller, Inc. v. Murphy, 379 Ill. 524, 42 N.E. 2d
78 (1942); see Crouch v. Murphy, 39o Ill. 112, 6o N.E. 2d 879 (1945); Karlson v. Murphy,
387 Ill. 436, 56 N.E. 2d 839 (1944).
256 Panther Creek Mines v. Murphy, 390 Ill. 23, 6o N.E. 2d 217 (i945).

257Ill. Rev. Stat. (i945) c. 48, § 2z8(d)(e)(f).
Ill. 203, 69 N.E. 2d 841 (1946).
2S9Ill. Rev. Stat. (x945) C. 48, § 223(d).
Local Union No. ii v. Garden, 396 Ill. 293, 71 N.E. 2d 637 (1947).

25& 395
260

261.397

II_ W~, 73 N.E.

262 Compare

2d 412

(1947).

Johnson v. Johnson, 381 11. 362, 45 N.E. 2d 625 (1942), and Havill v. Darch,
32o Ill. App. 667, 52 N.E. 2d 64 (1943), with Kanauske v. Clark, 388 Ill. 357, 57 N.E. 2d 89o
(1944); see also 42 Ill. L. Rev. 228 (1947).
263 Reiter v. Illinois National Casualty Co., 328 Ii. App. 234, 65 N.E. 2d 930 (1946).
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pellate court reasoned that in equity the defendant's motion to dismiss
submitted the case on the plaintiff's evidence alone and waived the right
to submit evidence after reversal. It adopted the Supreme Court's dictum that Section 64(4) of the Practice Act, "If the decision on the motion
is adverse to the defendant he may proceed to adduce evidence in support of his defense .... ," did not change the rule where thetrial court's

decision was favorable to the defendant. The Supreme Court on rehearing
reversed the appellate court and its own first opinion, holding that under
Section 74 an appeal is a continuation of the proceeding below so that,
under Section 64(4), the reversal in the appellate court was a decision "adverse to the defendant." This holding seems a workmanlike elimination of
an unnecessary difference between the practice in law and equity and anticipated an amendment to the Practice Act which achieved the same result264

Although the Illinois Supreme Court ruled on incidental questions of
evidence in many cases during the 1946-47 terms, only the few in which
decision turned solely on the evidence point are discussed in this section.
In _People v. Sims'6 s the Court dealt with the admissibility of a confession
obtained from a seventeen-year-old girl while a lie detector was attached
to her arm against her wishes. Her request for counsel had been denied.
While, unknown to the girl, the detector was not operating, she confessed.
The Court held the admission of the confession by the trial court reversible
error, saying, "The lie detector was used illegally and ....its application
influenced, if it did not induce, the confession.' ' 26 Presumably, this ruling
was based on a broad policy of excluding illegally obtained evidence,'6 7
rather than a belief that'confessions so obtained are untrustworthy. The
only reported decisions in point by other state supreme courts have upheld the trustworthiness of such lie-detector induced confessions.268 Indeed, contrary to the Sims decision, the Pennsylvania courts hold them
admissible even though the test was involuntary'269 but Pennsylvania, un-

like Illinois, does not follow the federal rules of exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. The Sims holding undoubtedly imposes a limit on the
64 Senate Bill 66, 65 Illinois
General Assembly, approved July
Ill.
69, 69 N.E. 2d 336 (1946).

2, 1947.

26395

661bid., at 72 and 338.
Rooney, 355 Ill. 613, i9o N.E. 85 (ig34); People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392,

267People v.

143

N.E. I12 (1924); People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923).
28 State v. Dehart, 242 Wis. 562, 8 N.W. 2d 36o (1943); Commonwealth v. Jones, 341 Pa.
541, ig A. 2d 389 (194i); Commonwealth v. Hipple, 333 Pa. 33, 3A. 2d 353 (1939).
269 Commonwealth v. Jones, 34i Pa. 54i, igA. 2d 389 (194); Commonwealth v. Hipple,
333 Pa. 33, 3 A. 2d 353 (1939).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
evidence-gathering techniques employed by Illinois police in connection
with use of the lie detector. But the lie detector will probably continue to
be used, for although confessions so obtained may be inadmissible, it remains a tool for obtaining clues leading to other kinds of evidence which
are admissible.270
In another recent case, Peoplev. Kraus,'27 the Court stated that when a

confession is attacked as involuntary all persons present when the confession was made must be called as witnesses, if practicable, so that the
court may have all the facts surrounding the making of the confession.
In this case the absence from the trial of a police captain allegedly present
at the making of the confession was not explained by the prosecution.The
Court indicated that this unexplained absence would have been grounds
for reversal had there not been other competent evidence which left no
doubt as to the defendant's guilt. The requirement that all persons in authority present at the confession be in-attendance at the trial, or that their
absence be satisfactorily explained, appears to be a rule peculiar to Illinois.272 Although this requirement may impose a burden on the prosecution, it does not seem unreasonable in view of prevalent third-degree
tactics.273 The Court's aflirmance of the conviction, despite admission of
the confession, because guilt was proved to the Court's satisfaction by
other competent evidence, is an established Illinois doctrine274 which has
been adopted by far the greater number of states.275

Zaremba v. Skurdialis27 indicates that the Illinois Supreme Court is
considerably hampered in its rulings on spousal evidence by legislation

which is both ambiguous and based on antiquated exclusionary policies.
Section 5 of the Evidence Act,2 77 which applies to civil cases, and Section
734 of the Criminal Code 78 were adopted in 1872 and 1874 respectively.
2703

Wigmore, Evidence § 999 (3d ed.,

27, 395

194o).

Ill. 233, 69 N.E. 2d 885 (1946).

486, ig N.E. 2d 373 (1939); People v. Arendarczyk, 367 Ill. 534,
272
People v. Ickes, 370 Ill.
278, 178 N.E. 95 (x931). For a tendency in the
12 N.E. 2d 2 (x937); People v. Cope, 345 Ill.

same direction in other states, see State v. Scarbrough, 167 La. 483, 119 So. 523 (1929) and
State v. Lord, 42 N.M. 638, 84 P. 2d 8o (1938).
273 Keedy, The Third Degree and Legal Interrogation of Suspects, 85 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
761 (1937).
290,
'74People v. Oberholdt, 359 Ill. 39, 193 N.E. 6o8 (1934); People v. McCurrie, 337 Ill.
1', 117 N.E. 193 (igi7); People v. Cleminson,
69 N.E. 214 (.929); People v. Michael, 280 Ill.
250 11. 135, 95 N.E. 157 (1911).
27S I Wigmore, Evidence § 2X (3d ed., 1940).
276395
277lI.

Ill.
437, 70 N.E. 2d 617 (1946).
Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 51, § 5.
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This legislation, codifying a number of obsolete common law rules, was
amended reluctantly and only after serious criticism by the Court 79 and
text writers.S ° Section 5 was described forty-one years ago by Wigmore
in the following language: "The whole of it is a patchwork of thirty years'
growth, and is full of inconsistencies which make it unique of its kind in
American legislation. ' 2SY The section to which this authoritative exception was taken in 19o6 was not amended by the Illinois legislature until
1
1935.2 2 The criminal statute was amended two years later.213 The complete spousal incompetency of the early common law is removed in both
amendments, but much is left to be desired in the proviso which disqualifies the husband or wife in matters related to "any communication or admission ....or any conversation ....during coverture." Such language
has in some jurisdictions not only been construed to give the sender of the
communication a privilege, but has been held to confine the privilege to
confidential communications.2' 4 The Illinois Court, however, seems to construe the language of the proviso not only to mean incompetency rather
than privilege, but also to cover not only confidential communications,
but any communication.25 Thus, when the defendant in the Zaremia case
offered testimony of the plaintiff's divorced wife, stating that she would
not "testify concerning matters touching on the confidential relationship
between husband and wife excluded by the statute, ' 21Sthe trial court held
the witness incompetent, and excluded the testimony. The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded, but failed to define the possible area of testimony
which does not "touch on the confidential relationship of husband and
wife" and which may be admissible. Although some decisions of the Court
may indicate that all communications, whether or not they are confidential, are inadmissible,27 the uncertainties regarding the statute,
coupled with the reversal in the instant case, would seem to call for an
opinion clearly delineating the scope of the statute. A desirable solution
People v. Kendall, 357 Ill. 448, 192 N.E. 378 (z934).
Wigmore, Some Evidence Statutes That fllinois Ought to Have, 11l1. L. Rev. 9 (19o6);
2 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 6og, 61o (3d ed., 1940).
281 Wigmore, Some Evidence Statutes That Illinois Ought to Have, x Ill. L. Rev. 9, z4
(r9o6).
212fI1. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 5r, § 5.
283 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 38, § 734.
284
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Mason, 272 Fed. 28 (C.C.A. 9th, 1921); Sexton v. Sexton, 129
Iowa 487, 105 N.W. 314 (I9o5); Commonwealth v. Sapp, go Ky. 580, 14 S.W. 834 (189o).
2S Dunn v. Heasley, 375 Ill.
43, 30 N.E. 2d 628 (I94O); Heineman v. Herman, 385 Ill.
19I,
,52 N.E. 2d 263 (943); Note, Evidence, Disability of Husband and Wife in Illinois, 3o Il. L.
Rev. 783 (1936).
286395 I1. 437, 438, 70 N.E. 2d 6x7, 618 (946).
297 Note 285 supra.
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to the problem is embodied in an amendment proposed by the Chicago
Bar Association when the 1935 amendment was adopted. This suggested
wording, after abolishing the incompetency of husband and wife, provided
that "neither [spouse] shall, without the consent of the other during mar''8
riage or afterwards, be permitted to testify to private communications. 2S
Such a statute would protect the privilege only for confidential communications, which modern writers seem to agree is the only exclusionary rule
pertaining to spousal testimony which the courts or legislatures are justi9

fied in retaining.21

One of the most firmly entrenched doctrines of the Illinois Supreme
9
Court is that excluding opinion evidence on an ultimate issue of fact.2 0
Gillette v. Chicago29s was a suit to recover expenses incurred by the plaintiff in shoring its building to protect it from settling of the soil caused by
city subway construction. The city appealed from an adverse judgment,
assigning as error failure to admit testimony of an expert witness. After
he had testified on various technical points, the expert was asked the following question: "Have you an opinion, based upon your knowledge of
the type of construction of the subway .... whether shoring or underpinning measures were necessary during the construction of the subway?" Refusal of the trial court to admit an answer was upheld by the
Supreme Court on the ground that the subject was inappropriate for expert testimony since it constituted the ultimate issue before the jury.
Quite apart from its coincidence with the ultimate issue, the question
seems improper because it did not make clear what facts concerning the
construction of the subway and of the building were known to the expert.
The Illinois Court, however, has long held that the admission of expert
opinion on an ultimate issue of fact would "usurp the province of the
jury. )292 Why the jury may not have the help of an expert on the very
point upon which it is incapable itself of making an intelligible determination is difficult to understand. Further, most observers agree that the
"province of the jury" cannot be "usurped," since the jury may still reject the expert's opinion and accept some other view, "and no legal power, not even the judge's order, can compel them to accept the witness's
88
2 McCormick, Notes and Suggestions on the Evidence Act of Illinois, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
465, 467 (i936).
289 Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-Family Relations, x3 Minn. L. Rev. 675 (1929); Evidence, Disability of Husband and Wife in Illinois, 30
Ill. L. Rev. 783 (1936).
290 King and Pillinger, Opinion Evidence in Illinois 8-9 (1942).

29'396 Ill. 619,
292

72 N.E. 2d 326 (1947).
Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Springfield & Northwestern R. Co., 67 Il1.
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(1873).
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opinion against their own.' ' 29 3 In the federal courts and in many state

courts the judge himself is permitted to express his opinion on the weight
of the evidence, and the cases are legion in which the jury has taken a
different position from that taken by the trial judge. 94
In view of the strong line of precedent in Illinois, adverse criticism of
the result in the Gillette case must be tempered, but one may well question
the Court's failure to question such precedent or to suggest legislative
action. A ready model for the legislature is at hand in Section 9 of the
Uniform Expert Testimony Act,2 95 which admits opinion evidence on is-

sues like the disputed one inthe Gillette case, leaving the opponent to crossexamination to test the underlying facts upon which the expert has formed
his opinion. Adoption of such a statute would not only bring this area of
Illinois evidence law into agreement with "the modem tendency to make
no distinction between evidential and ultimate facts subject to expert
opinion" 296 but would eliminate many of the recurrent difficulties raised
by the hypothetical question.
II. THE COURT

The analysis of some of the cases in the preceding sections gives some
indication of why the Court decides cases as it does. The Court's techniques of statutory construction, its attitude toward the state constitution, toward local government bodies, and toward administrative agencies, its use of precedent, and the extent of its concern with the social implications of its decisions have each been pointed to as influencing the result of one or another of the cases. In this section an attempt is made to
examine the Court as a social institution and to determine the influence on
its decisions of such factors as the quantity of its work, its method of preparing opinions, and the kinds of cases which appear on its docket.
A recurrent problem with the Illinois Supreme Court has been keeping
abreast of its business. Its inability to keep up with the flow of appeals
resulted in the enlargement of the Court from three to seven justices in
1870, in the creation of intermediate appellate courts in 1877, in the certiorari act of 19o9, and in the addition of commissioners to assist the
Court in 1927. At present, however, the Court is keeping up with its work,

so that cases are decided in the term after they are docketed.297 Indeed,
7 Wigmore, Evidence § 1920 (3d ed., 194o).
294 Ladd, Review of King and Pillinger, Opinion Evidence in Illinois, 29 A.B.A.J. I44
(1943).
29S
Uniform Model Expert Testimony Act, § 9, U.L.A. (Supp., 1946).
296 State v. Cox, 172 Minn. 226, 230, 215 N.W. z8g, 19z (1927).
297 Table 2, infra, at 165, describes the work of the Court during the last year.
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at no term last year was the Court obliged to carry the call of the civil
docket over into a third week. The number of opinions written, 248 last
year, has declined substantially from a peak in the twenties and has continued to decline slightly in recent years.298 During the years i9oo to i9io
the Court handed down about 500 opinions a year,2 99 and from i9io to
i9x9 an annual average of 388 opinions.3 0 In I923 Mr. justice Thompson
indicated that the Court was writing 525 opinions a year, 30' and in 1936
Mr. Justice Orr found an over-all average of 285 opinions a year. 30 2 The
members of the Illinois Supreme Court still bear a heavier burden of
opinion writing than do the judges of most states, but that burden is con30 3
siderably lighter than that of the judges in Michigan and New York.
However, should the present high level of business activity generate a
large volume of cases for the highest state courts as it did in the twenties,
overcrowded dockets will again become a disturbing factor. 0 4 Moreover,

if there should be an increase in the number of cases argued orally, if the
number of dissenting opinions should increase, or if the business of the
Court should include more important cases, there would be insufficient
time to hear even the number of cases decided this year. Furthermore, if
new duties were added, such as those suggested by the Chicago Bar Association,305 the situation would become even more serious.
The Illinois Supreme Court is not continuously in session, but meets in
Springfield for five terms each year, commencing on the second Mondays
of September, November, January, March, and May. During 1946-47,
for example, the Court sat only during two weeks each term or a total of
298 See Table

3, infra, at 166.
A Statistical Review of the Work of the Supreme Court of Illinois for Ten Years i9oo
to i9io, at 153 (1912), deducting the number of cases dismissed on motion and cases of super299

sedeas and certiorari denied from the total of cases filed.
300 Legislative Reference Bureau of Illinois, Constitutional Convention Bulletin No. io,
at 896 Table 8 (1920).
30, Report of the Illinois State Bar Association 457, 463 (1923).
302 Orr, the Supreme Court of Illinois, 24 111. B. J. 297 (i936); see Clarke, Supreme Court
Cases Increase,

25

Chicago Bar Record 222 (I944).

Statistics on the volume of work handled by the highest state courts are available in the
annual reports of the Judicial Councils of California, Connecticut, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Texas, and Washington, and in the following law reviews for
their respective states: 14 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 213 (1942)(Colorado); 7 La. L. Rev. 165 (1947);
8 Md. L. Rev. 9 I , 112 (i944); i5 Miss. L. J. 66 (1942); iI Mo. L. Rev. 345 (1946); 1947 Wis.
L. Rev. 39.
304 Statistics on long term trends in other states are available in the reports of the Judicial
Councils of Connecticut, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Minnesota, and in 7 La. L.
Rev. 165 (i947) and in 1947 Wis. L. Rev. 39.
3os Witwer, The Illinois Constitution and the Courts, i5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 53 (1947).
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TABLE 2*
THE WORK OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT DURING THE TERMS
SEPTEMBER, 1946 TO MAY, 1947
TEam
TOTAL

Septem- November
her

i. Advisement Docket ...............
2. Rehearing Docket .................
3. People's Docket ...................
4. Civil Docket ......................
S. Leaveto Appeal Docket ...........
6. Compensation Docket .............
7. Number of Days Sitting ...........
8. Lawyers Admitted to Bar ..........
9. Motions Presented ................
io. Announcements of dispositions of motions, etc.........................
ii. Cases remanded on confessions of error by Attorney General ...........
Dispositions of petitions for leave to
appeal ...........................
13.
Allowed .....................
14.
Denied, dismissed, or stricken .....

January

March

May

Sr

6o

71

5i

53

26

22

21

22

23

114

io4
68

go

8I
48

66
58

74
46

4r5

II

21

22

io8

6

5

5

29

52

11

72
2
2

286
292

9

9

7

7

7

39

39

273

17

231

592

47

32
24

46

45

32

194

72

59

46

42

44

263

19

21

6

I5

10

71

50
13

2

II

103

3
z6

23

2

5
6

21
2

19

0

37
II

2

6
5

30

2

12.

i 5.

Dispositions of petitions for writs or
error in compensation cases .........
z6.
Allowed ........................
17.
Denied or dismissed .............
z8. Dispositions of petitions for rehearing
19.
Allowed ........................
20.
Denied ........................
21.
22.

Call of People's Docket ............

23.
24.

Argued Orally ..................
Dismissed under Rule 69 .........
Affirmed under Rule 41 ..........

25.

Submitted on Briefs .............

19

so

1
1

6
1
5

5

4
7

3

i

17

27

21
0
21

21
2
19

21

109

2
25

19
0
19

4

8

17

101

33

22

31

i6

126

i5

16
14

24

22
2

3
3
1

2

13

0
2

0

9
0

13

84

0

17
4
3
0

11
30
1

33
r6

36
18

173
76

26. Call of Civil Docket ...............
27.
Submitted on Brief ..............
28.
Submitted on Petition for Rehearing, etc .........................
29.
Argued Orally ..................

33
17

43

28

14

11

2

0
29

0

2

4

14

17

is

14

8
89

30. Opinions Filed ....................

48

48

65

44

47

252t

* Sources: Lines x-6, the printed dockets prepared by the clerk of the Illinois Supreme Court; Lines 12-17,
the tables in 393 Ill. 629, 394 Ill. 629, 395 Ill. 627, 397 Ill. zog; all other lines, the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin.

t This figure from the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin on number of opinions filed can perhaps be reconciled with a
count of opinions published in the reports with filing dates during the last five terms by deducting opinions filed and
withdrawn when rehearings were granted.
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thirty-nine days. Cases are assigned to the judges for opinions in the order
in which the cases appear on the docket, so that each judge is assigned
every seventh case. This method of mechanical assignment, which disregards the abilities and interests of the respective judges, has been defended
on the grounds that individual assignment by the chief justice cannot
avoid feelings of favoritism, that each judge is induced to put forth his
best efforts to keep abreast on his share of the work, and that the judges'
never come to rely upon the learning of any judge as a specialist in a particular type of case.3°6
If the case has been submitted on briefs, the judge to whom it is assigned generally writes his opinion without any formal discussion of the
TABLE 3*
THE VOLUME OF WORK IN THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

Opinions Published...........

Petitions for Rehearings ......
Petitions for Leave to Appeal..
Allowed ..................

Denied or Dismissed .......
Error in
Petitions for Writs of
Compensation Cases .......

Allowed ..................

Denied or Dismissed .......

1943-44

1944-45

1945-46

1946-47

264

258

245

248

157

1io
96

31

22

23

'9.7%

22.9%

22.3%

126
80"3%0

74
77"I%

8o
77.7%0

138
74t
14
18.9%

6o
8I.x%0

113

88
103

14t

24
i1

38

18

30
13

42.9%

45.8%

47.4%

43.3%

52.6%

56.7%

6
8

57.1%

13

54.2%

20

17

* Source: The published reports of the Court.

t January, March, and May terms only. The Reporter did not begin to publish a table of cases
on the Leave to Appeal and Compensation Dockets until January z944.

case with his colleagues. A conference on the case before the judges separate at the end of each term is almost precluded, since the rules of the Court
do not require the filing of the appellee's brief before the first day of the
term and of the appellant's reply brief before the second Monday of the
term. During the crowded term days the Court probably has no time for
preliminary conferences on newly submitted cases. A short postponement
of adjournment after all cases have been submitted conceivably would
306 Mr. Floyd Thompson, a former justice of the Illinois Supreme Court, twenty years ago
gave an excellent account of how the Court handled its work. Report of the Illinois State Bar
Association 457 (1923), reprinted in io Chicago Bar Ass'n Rec. 97 (1926) and in Dodd and
Edmunds, Illinois Appellate Procedure § iS (1929). See also Carter, Methods of Work in Courts
of Review, 12 Ill. L. Rev. 231, 251 (1917); Hiscock, The Court of Appeals of New York;
Some Features of Its Organization and Work, 14 Cornell L. Q. 131, 138 (1929); but cf. Hughes.
The Supreme Court of the United States 59 (1928).
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provide time for conferences, but would still permit only a cursory examination of the briefs and abstracts. If the case is argued orally, the judges
hold a short conference after the day's arguments and take an "impression vote" on the preliminary reaction to the oral argument. The vote is
neither final nor binding on the judge writing the opinion. This indicates
a difference, however, between a case submitted on oral argument and a
case submitted on briefs. Only in the former has the judge assigned to
write the opinion had any prior conference with or expression of opinion
from his colleagues. 30 7
Between terms each judge takes the record and two copies of the briefs
and abstract in cases assigned to him during thepreceding term to his office
to write his respective opinions. Upon completion, the manuscripts are
sent to the official reporter, who prints the opinion and mails a galley
proof to each of the justices. Thus, at the end of the vacation each justice
has copies of the opinions of the other justices and can review them in conjunction with the briefs and abstracts of the cases in preparation for conferences. At the beginning of the next term, conferences are held on the
opinions submitted, and the opinions, if approved, are filed. Petitions for
rehearing, however, are submitted in almost half the cases, and the corresponding opinions.are not published, but are placed .upon a Rehearing
Docket and reconsidered at the next term. Minor changes are often made
on the basis of the petitions for rehearing; occasionally an additional per
curiam opinion is fled; and in a surprisingly large proportion of cases the
petition for rehearing is granted and the case is put on the docket a second
8

time.30

This method of writing opinions has some tendency to make the opinions and the decisions of the Court one-judge affairs. 3°9 In those cases not
argued orally (a majority), the judge to whom the case is assigned reaches
a decision and writes the opinion without any preliminary conference with
his colleagues; in those argued orally, the judge has only a non-definitive
"impression vote" to guide him. The judges, therefore, instead of discussing the case together on equal terms, begin the discussion on the basis of
a prepared, complete opinion of a colleague. A judge reading a complete
opinion will probably be more reluctant to disagree and less likely to suggest and explore difficulties that come to his mind than if the case were be307 Compare Lardner, Thoughts on the Supreme Court of Illinois, 42 Ill. L. Rev. 53, 63
(1947).
309

See Table 2.

309 For other comments on the Court's method of reaching decision and writing opinions see
Lardner, Thoughts on the Supreme Court of Illinois, 42 Ill. L. Rev. 53 (x947).
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ing discussed before an opinion had been prepared. The lack of prior conferences is thus perhaps reflected in the small number of dissents and concurrences. The Court has generally been in agreement; indeed, the proportion of cases in which the Court split declined from 17.5 per cent in
1935-36 to 5.5 per cent last year. 310 Most of the few dissents and concurrences were without opinions, for a dissenting justice must either crowd
the writing of a dissent into already full term days or add the dissenting
opinion to the list of opinions he must prepare for the next term. The
value of special concurrences and dissenting opinions in clarifying issues
and introducing new ideas into the law has been demonstrated by the experience of the United States Supreme Court. And the effect of written
dissents in bringing about important changes in the law is also well known.
Another result of the burden of preparing written dissents and special
concurrences may be the small number of cases in which a conscious attempt is made to shape the law. One might speculate that when a written
opinion is presented in final form to a busy Court the natural tendency is
to eliminate unnecessary controversial matter that might evoke dissents.
Whether this factor, or the kind of cases the Court hears, or the lack of
an intermediate appellate court in so many cases, is most responsible for
the uninteresting character of the Illinois advance sheets is impossible to
determine.
A potentially greater danger of the lack of preliminary conferences is
that the outcome of the case may depend on the judge assigned to write
the opinion. However, a study of last year's opinions, and of dissents and
concurrences for several preceding years, showed no case in which it could
be asserted that if it had been assigned to another judge the result would
have been different. Neither did this study show any definite differences
in viewpoints among the justices, so that the inability to find evidence of
the influence of individual views on the decisions may result from the general similarity of their views. However, a more comprehensive study of
several years' cases might have yielded more conclusive results.
The great majority of cases coming to the Court-almost 75 per centarrive there by means of various rights of direct appeal.31' As already indicated, under the Constitution an appeal of right may be taken to the Supreme Court "in all criminal cases, and cases in which a franchise, or a
freehold, or the validity of a statute is involved." By statute, all these
cases (except criminal cases "below the grade of felony") go to the Su30 In a recent year the United States. Supreme Court split in 58 per .cent of its opinions,
Pritchett, The Divided Supreme Court, I944-1945, 4 4 Mich. L. Rev. 427 (1945).
3-1See Table 4.
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preme Court directly. Such cases constitute over half the cases decided
by the Court. In addition, under Section 75 of the Civil Practice Act all
cases in which "a construction of the constitution is involved" and cases
in which "the validity of a municipal ordinance is involved and in which
the trial judge shall certify that in his opinion the public interest so requires, and in all cases relating to revenue, or in which the State is interested as a party or otherwise" may be appealed directly to the Supreme
Court. These cases constitute about 12 per cent of the number decided by
the Court. Further, a direct appeal lies under various special statutes, the
most important of which are listed in Table 4. These statutes give rise to
3-9 per cent of the cases decided by the Court.
The Court itself grants permission for review in io-i6 per cent of its
cases. Such permissive review includes petitions for leave to appeal from
appellate courts and petitions for writs of error in compensation cases.
It should be noted that the Court has much more readily granted permissive review in compensation cases, granting over 40 per cent of the petitions, than it has in petitions for leave to appeal, only 20 per cent of which
have been granted.31 2 This difference may be traceable to a belief that
compensation cases coming directly from the circuit courts require stricter
review than do cases coming from intermediate appellate courts where
they have already had one appellate review.
Theoriginal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is defined by the Constitution to lie "in cases relating to the revenue, in mandamus, and habeas
corpus." Last year this jurisdiction was invoked in three mandamus cases
to compel action by lower court judges, and in four habeas corpus cases
on behalf of criminal prisoners. The nuiiiber of original actions decided by
opinion has varied over the years from 3 to 5 per cent of the total. Cases
coming up on certificates of importance granted by the appellate courts
furnish only 2 or 3 per cent of the Court's business; and cases coming up
by appeal of right from the appellate courts furnish another 2 or 3 per
cent of the Court's business.
It should be noted that over 75 per cent of the cases come directly from
'the trial courts, either by direct appeal of right or by permissive writs of
error in compensation cases, and only ii to 17 per cent come from intermediate appellate courts. These figures indicate that in 8o to go per cent
of its cases the Supreme Court is either the first court or the first appellate
step and, therefore, takes the issues without, the preliminary sifting and
pointing up which might occur during an appellate court appeal. Thus in
312

See Tables

2

and 3-
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many cases the Court is merely applying well-established rules of law to
given facts, rather than deciding new points of law.
In almost 8o per cent of the cases, the decision as to whether or not the
Supreme Court will review is made by the litigants themselves by taking
advantage of the Court's original jurisdiction, by direct appeal of right,
or by an appeal of right from the appellate courts. In about 3 per cent of
the cases the trial court makes the decision through its power to determine
TABLE 4*
OPINIONS ANALYZED BY SOURcE Op AUTHORITY To REVIEW
193536

Original Actions ......................
Direct Review of Right:
Criminal Felonies ................

o
3.9%
83

193940

7

14

3.1%

12.9% 21.2%

58
Freeholds .......................... 40
i5.6% 25.8%
Constitutional Questions .............

Franchise .........................

25
29
II.3% 11. 1%

8
3.1%

8

194546

13

3.1%

5.3%

194647

8
3.2%

60

84

8T

55

51

58

23.3% 343% 32.7%

20.8% 21.3% 20.8% 23.4%
18
x7
6
30
6.9% 7.3%
6.2%
11.4%

3

2

5

1. 1%

1.9%

9

4

6

7

6

4.0%

1.5%

2.3%

2-9%

2.4%

.4%/

.8%
Validity of Municipal Ordinance ......

55

194445

3

1

2

5.3%

56

29

32.3%

X94344,

.8%

1.2%

25
21
26
24
32
Revenue ........................... 19
9.I% IO.I% 8.6% io.I%
7.4% 14.2%
I
..............
.......
2
5
State Interested ....................
1.9%
.9% .........
4% ....... .......
4
4-6% ......
3
.7
Illinois Commerce Commission .......
ri.6% ........ 1.6%
2 .7%
1 .3%
-4%
......
I
......
5
6
4
Election Contests ...................
2.3%

1.8%

Unemployment Compensation Act ..................

1.9%.

17

2

2

2

Eminent Domain ...................

4

3

4

1-6%
1

1-3%
3
1.3%

1.5%

Other Special Statutes ...............

Review by, Permission of the Supreme
Court:
Leave toAppeal ...................

.4%

6.6%

Workmen's Compensation Writs of Error ............. ................ II
4.3%
6
Review by Certificate of Importance....
Review of Right from the Appellate
Courts:
Criminal Cases ....................
Constitutional Questions .....................
*Source: The published reports of the Court.

.8%

31
1.8%

12

13

5.3%
5

2.3%

2.2%

9
3.5%

5

S.......

2

2
2.5

'.1%

2 .2%

2

9%

.........
4%.......

8

3.o%

...............

6.6%

2

.8%

3
.8%

.8%
1.9%

2
.8%

.8%

X.2%
2

.8%

18
r9
28
10.9% 7.8% 7.3%

4.9%
9
3..4%

9
3.5%
5
.9%

6i%
4

5.2%
3

1.6%

1.2%

3

7

4

4

2.7%

1. 6%

-I. 1%

2

13

1
.8%'1.6%

1. 60,
.......
A4 .......
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that the validity of a municipal ordinance raises questions of public importance. In 2 to 3 per cent of the cases the appellate court makes the
decision through granting a certificate of importance. In only io to
15 per cent of the cases does the Court itself make the decision by granting leave to appeal or writs of error in compensation cases. As a result,
the Supreme Court has very little control over the number and nature of
cases which it decides. Moreover, the Illinois legislature itself has only
partial control, because more than half the cases reach the Court on
grounds enumerated in the Constitution. The legislature can require that
such litigation pass through an intermediate appellate review, but it cannot prevent an ultimate appeal to the highest court. Yet the Court might,
TABLE 5*
LEGAL RELATIONS GIVING RISE TO LITIGATION REACHING THE SUPREME COURT
193536
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* Source: The published reports of the Court.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

by further restricting its construction of the terms defining the grounds for
appeal, and by requiring strict adherence to procedural prerequisites, decrease the number of such cases reaching it.
As has already been indicated, a remarkably small number of cases in
business law, torts, domestic relations, and property matters not involving
title are decided each year. The fact that the Court is occupied with so
many cases reaching it on grounds enumerated in the Constitution and
the Civil Practice Act is probably responsible for the small numbers of
TABLE 6*
LEGAL RELATIONS GIVING RISE TO LITIGATION REACHING
THE APPELLATE COURTS, 1946-47
AEsnACT OP, IONS

FULL OPM'ONS
No.

Procedure ...................

6
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7
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State Officials ................................................
Taxes ....................
2
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Other ...................
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z
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.

1.5

4
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9.6
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2
2

7.2
1.2
1.2

2
2
2

1.0
1.0
1.0

3

1.8

.....................

45

27.1
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12

7.2
1..2

25

12.6
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Property Law:

Real and Personal Property.
Trusts......................

12
2

7.2
1.2

Wills and Probate ..........

8
21

12.7

9

5.4

Landlord and Tenant ......
Criminal Law .............

4.8

10

4
8
25
12

5.0
2.0

4.0
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* Source: The published advance sheet reports of the Appellate Courts, September x946 through
JU1y 15, 1947.

cases in other categories heard each year. Table 5 indicates the types of
legal relations which give rise to litigation considered by the Court. It
does not indicate the field of law involved in the appeal, and no case is
classified under procedure and evidence or constitutional problems unless
it could not properly be placed elsewhere. Thus, for example, a tort case
is classified under torts even though the only fields of law discussed on appeal were procedure and evidence.
To emphasize the division of the fields of appellate litigation between
the Supreme Court and the six appellate courts, Table 6 sets forth a simi-
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lar classification of cases in the latter courts during 1946-47. Comparison
is complicated by the fact that more than half of the appellate court cases
are reported only by memorandum decisions indicating the legal problems
raised, but not necessarily the facts which produced the litigation. This
analysis indicates that the activities giving rise to most of the appellate
court cases are business, torts, landlord and tenant, and domestic relations.
Finally, the much discussed underrepresentation of Chicago on the
Court is substantiated by the fact that approximately half of the cases
originate in Cook County, whereas only one of the seven justices is elected
from that area.31 3
CONCLUSION
This study has revealed serious inadequacies in the work of the Illinois
Supreme Court. Although the major responsibility for these shortcomings
lies with the Illinois Constitution and the Civil Practice Act, the responsibility for the method of assigning cases for opinion writing and the lack
of prior conferences, for the occasional deficiencies in judicial craftsmanship, and for the apparent inertia in dealing with social issues, can be laid
at the door of the Court. However minor these latter factors may be compared with the influence of the outmoded appellate structure saddled on
the Court by constitution and statute, they deserve brief comment.
That a prisoner has a right to a post-conviction hearing when he alleges
denial of due process in his conviction is a notion rooted deep in constitutional liberty. The Court's attitude toward the social consequences of its
decisions is indicated by the virtually complete inability of a prisoner to
obtain such a hearing in Illinois. Although some procedure must be
established to prevent crowding the dockets with fabricated or inadequate
petitions, the existing method, which requires the prisoner to present his
application for consideration seven to twelve times in order to escape the
procedural maze of the state courts and secure his initial hearing on the
merits in the federal courts, is totally inadequate. 314 Adoption of some of
the suggestions made in the Criminal Law Section might substantially
improve the existing situation. 3' s In another field which involved fundamental political questions, the Court, last year, largely ignored the problems of religious liberty and the relationship of church and state by saying
313Last year 48.8 per cent of the cases reaching the Supreme Court originated in the First
Appellate District, which includes Chicago.
314 See

Criminal Law Section, at rx8 supra.

3s Ibid., at 129-31 supra.
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only that church-financed public school religious "classes do not violate
the freedom of conscience of any individual or group so long as the classes
are conducted upon a purely voluntary basis.' '36 The Court's resistance
to change is more dearly shown in private law. It clung to the strict old
rule of mutuality in specific performance,I' 7 refused to abate the purchase
price where the vendors wife refused to join in the deed, 31' put a widow's
old dower right ahead of her statutory share,39 and declined to admit
evidence of usage in construing the language of a deed." ° It limited the
Workmen's Compensation remedy by strictly circumscribing the scope of
employment.32
Less important are occasional inadequacies of judicial craftsmanship.
Multiplication of the grounds for decision obscures the holdings of a few
cases and may reflect the indefinite character of the issues in cases coming
to the Court directly from trial courts. 322 More important than multiple
holdings as a means of avoiding sharp, definite decisions, the Court has
some tendency to use alternative propositions in similar cases, emphasizing the one which will serve as a rationale for the decision. Thus in two
zoning cases the Court employed the propositions, that a zoning ordinance
is presumed to be valid and that a property owner may use his land as he
desires limited only by a reasonable exertion of the police power, to
achieve contrary results. 3' In construing statutes, the Court's work is a
curious combination of extreme technicality as in its invalidation of sev32 4
eral tax levies for failure to comply meticulously with the statutes,
and the statesmanlike repair of omissions and inconsistencies in legisla3,6
People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School District No. 71, 396 I1. 14,

z61 (1947), cert. granted 67 S. Ct. 1524 (1947), discussed at x31 supra.
402, 70 N.E. 2d 56o (1946), discussed at 143 supra.
317 Wloczewski v. Kozlowski, 395 Ill.

71 N.E. 2d

318Pearson v. Adams, 394 Ill. 391, 68 N.E. 2d 777 (1946), discussed at r46 supra.
"19Bruce

v. McCormick, 396 Ill. 482,

320Ambarann

72

N.E. 2d 333 (1947), discussed at 149 supra.

Corp. v. Old Ben Corp. 395 Ill.
154, 69 N.E. 2d 835 (1946), discussed at

145 Supra.
"'x Public Service Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 395 Ill. 238, 69 N.E. 2d 875 (1946), discussed
at 155 supra.

3?See, for example, Wloczewski v. Kozlowski, 395 Ill. 402, 7o N.E. 2d 56o (1946), discussed
at r43 supra.
3232700 Irving Park Building Corp. v. Chicago, 395 Ill. 138, 69 N.E. 2d 827 (1946), noted in
14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 718 (1947), discussed at '36 supra; DeBartolo v. Oak Park, 396 Ill. 404,
71 N.E. 2d 693 (1947), discussed at 137 supra.
"4 See, for example, Saline Branch Drainage District v. Urbana-Champaign Sanitary District, 395 Ill.
26, 69 N.E. 2d 251 (1947), discussed at 140 supra.
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Seldom during the year were precedents miscited. In one case,
however, three of the cases cited contained facts different enough from
the main case to make them doubtful authority for the Court's insistence
on strict performance of a contract for the purchase of land. 3 26 And in
another case the Court cited a long line of cases all based upon a case in
which an appropriation ordinance was filed instead of a tax ordinance,
when the issue was whether filing the original tax ordinance instead of a
32 7
copy invalidated the tax levy.
The potential dangers of lack of conferences during the preparation of
opinions have already been discussed. Although the method may be appropriate for the large numbers of insignificant cases reaching the Court
as a result of inadequacies in the appellate structure, one-judge opinion
writing may have serious consequences in important cases. The small number of dissents and special concurrences, and the infrequency with which
the Court attempts to create patterns in the law, may be symptoms of the
one-judge opinion. Even the remotest possibility that the decision of a
case may depend upon which judge is assigned to write the opinion
(though no case has been found in which it could be said that this oc81
curred) calls for a revision of the Court's working habits.32
The greatest influence upon the totality of Illinois Supreme Court decisions is exerted by the Illinois Constitution and the Civil Practice Act.32 9
The large percentage of real property cases and the paucity of commercial
cases is testimony of the anachronistic nature of the Constitution of 1870.
Preemption of the Court's time with trivial issues of law and complicated
fact situations unsorted by intermediate appellate review is apparently
one reason for what amounts, in most instances, to final review at the appellate court level of important litigation not entitled to mandatory Supreme Court review. It seems essential to overhaul an appellate review
system which leaves much consequential commercial litigation to intermediate appellate courts in order to give review of right to cases incidentally involving title to a few rods of freehold. If the Court is to deal with
more significant issues, it must be given a larger measure of control over
the cases which it hears.
Much could be done by the legislature through revision of Section 75 of
tion.3

32s

Anderson v. Park Ridge, 396 fIl. 235, 72 N.E. 2d 210 (1947), discussed at r4i supra.

326Johnson v. Riedler, 395 Ill. 412, 7o N.E. 2d 570 (1946), discussed at z47 supra.

327People ex rel. Mcward v. Wabash R. Co., 395 Ill. 243, 7o N.E. 2d 36 (3946), discussed
at i4o supra.
328 Compare
39

discussion at 166-68 supra.

See discussion of the Court's constitutional and statutory framework at io8 supra.
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the Civil Practice Act. If direct review of right by the Supreme Court were
eliminated, it is probable that many of the more trivial cases would not
survive review in the appellate courts. The least that might be accomplished by so revising the Civil Practice Act is that issues would be clarified at a lower level, and the Supreme Court might then make rules of
law without being compelled to digest records complicated by intricate

facts.
Finally, it must be recognized that the Supreme Court will never have
the requisite measure of control over its docket until the Judiciary Article
of the Constitution of Illinois is amended. Only a constitutional amendment can eliminate appeals of right in litigation of no importance in the
twentieth century.

